The Village of Palatine sued Thomas Paulick in Cook County Circuit Court on five counts seeking enforcement of an unpaid $9,855 administrative fine, property repair orders, additional fines, and injunctive relief. On May 30, 2025, the circuit court granted summary judgment in the Village's favor on all five counts. However, Paulick had filed counterclaims on April 25, 2025, alleging trespass, fabrication of evidence, and harassment, which remained pending. The summary judgment order contained no Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding. Paulick filed a notice of appeal on June 27, 2025, and the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over a summary judgment order that resolved fewer than all claims in a multi-claim case without a Rule 304(a) express written finding. The court held it did not. Under Rule 304(a), when multiple claims are pending, a final judgment as to fewer than all claims is not immediately appealable absent an express written finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. The circuit court made no such finding, and its own subsequent orders — reserving attorney fees, interest, and additional fines for later determination — confirmed the case was ongoing.

For practicing attorneys, this case is a clear reminder that in multi-claim litigation, securing a Rule 304(a) finding is a prerequisite to appealing a partial final judgment. Failing to obtain that finding — or incorrectly asserting one exists — will result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Janet Drobick sued Costco Wholesale Corporation after falling in its parking lot on February 8, 2022, allegedly due to a pavement deviation. Following discovery, Costco moved for summary judgment, arguing the one-quarter inch deviation was de minimis and triggered no common-law duty. The circuit court struck Drobick's opposition affidavit—in which she claimed her multiple sclerosis made her more susceptible to minor defects—because it directly contradicted her deposition testimony in which she unequivocally denied that her MS contributed to the fall. The court then entered summary judgment for Costco, and Drobick appealed both rulings.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on both issues. On the affidavit, the court reaffirmed that Illinois law prohibits a non-movant from contradicting sworn deposition admissions through a subsequent affidavit to avoid summary judgment. On the de minimis doctrine, the court held that a one-quarter inch pavement deviation—far below the generally recognized two-inch ceiling—does not present a reasonably foreseeable hazard to a person exercising ordinary care and therefore imposes no duty to repair or warn. The court emphasized the minimal size of the defect, the absence of aggravating circumstances, and the unreasonable burden that a contrary rule would place on large commercial landowners in a midwestern climate.

For practicing attorneys, this decision reinforces the vitality of the de minimis doctrine in Illinois premises liability cases and underscores the critical importance of consistent deposition testimony, as post-deposition affidavits that contradict prior sworn statements will be disregarded at the summary judgment stage.

Jermaine Cooper pleaded guilty in 2006 to delivery of a controlled substance near a park and received a 12-year sentence. After completing his sentence and exhausting prior postconviction efforts, Cooper filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition in January 2024 seeking to vacate the 2022 dismissal of his Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) petition. The circuit court dismissed the section 2-1401 petition in May 2024, characterizing it as a postconviction petition and finding Cooper lacked standing. Cooper appealed, arguing the court improperly recharacterized his petition without providing the admonishments required under People v. Shellstrom and People v. Pearson.

The First District affirmed on both issues. First, the court held that the circuit court did not actually recharacterize the petition — despite inartful language, the ruling was substantively a merits dismissal of the section 2-1401 petition itself. Second, the court held that sua sponte dismissal was proper because Cooper's section 2-1401 petition was directed solely at obtaining PCHA relief, and Cooper had no standing under the PCHA having already completed his sentence, including mandatory supervised release.

For practitioners, this case reinforces that Shellstrom and Pearson admonishments serve no purpose when a petitioner has permanently lost postconviction standing, and that courts may dismiss section 2-1401 petitions sua sponte after 30 days when the relief sought is legally unavailable on the face of the petition.

Anthony Perez was convicted of first-degree murder committed in 1979 when he was 18 years old and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. In 2019, he filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition asserting an Eighth Amendment Miller claim, a proportionate penalties clause claim under the Illinois Constitution, and arguments grounded in scientific studies on young adult brain development. The circuit court ultimately dismissed both claims, and Perez appealed, also arguing that appointed postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance.

The First District affirmed on all three issues. First, the court held that Miller's Eighth Amendment protections apply only to juvenile offenders and cannot be extended to defendants who were 18 or older at the time of the offense — a policy choice the court left to the legislature or the Illinois Supreme Court. Second, the court held that Perez could not establish cause for his proportionate penalties clause claim because such challenges have been available in Illinois for decades, predating Miller, and neither subsequent Miller-related case law nor generalized scientific studies on young adult brain development constitute an objective factor that prevented earlier assertion of the claim. Third, the court found no unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel, who filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and had no obligation to advance legally meritless arguments against binding supreme court authority.

This decision reinforces the strict boundaries of the cause-and-prejudice test for successive postconviction petitions and confirms that brain science studies alone — without case-specific evidence tied to the defendant's own mental functioning — will not satisfy the cause prong.

In this post-dissolution appeal from St. Clair County, Kenneth Brosh challenged a February 2023 trial court order that denied his petition to terminate maintenance based on alleged de facto marriage, denied his claim of a substantial change in income, extended Donna's maintenance at $3,000 per month for 30 months retroactive to January 2022, and reduced child support from $2,301.69 to $1,493.00. Kenneth proceeded pro se on appeal. The Fifth District affirmed on all issues.

On the de facto marriage claim, the court applied the totality-of-circumstances test under Section 510(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and found the evidence—Richard spending only one night in Donna's home over two and a half years, minimal shared holidays, and a repaid loan—insufficient to establish a resident, continuing conjugal relationship. On the income modification claim, the trial court found Kenneth's testimony not credible due to lack of transparency regarding rental income, determined his income remained $313,493 annually, and the appellate court deferred to those credibility findings. The maintenance extension was upheld given Donna's fluctuating income, inexperience managing rental properties received at dissolution, pandemic-related delays, health issues, and Kenneth's own failure to pay support beginning January 2022.

Practically, this case reinforces that the burden to prove de facto marriage is demanding and fact-intensive, that undocumented income claims will not overcome adverse credibility findings, and that courts retain broad discretion to extend maintenance where the recipient faces documented obstacles to self-sufficiency. Donna's request for Rule 375(b) sanctions was denied because Kenneth cited case law and made substantive arguments, even though all were rejected.

In this private adoption proceeding, Mother and her aunt Marsha filed a petition to adopt minor Gianna T., alleging Father was unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Illinois Adoption Act for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare for over one year. The Macon County Circuit Court found Father unfit by clear and convincing evidence following a fitness hearing, then determined termination of his parental rights was in the minor's best interest. Father appealed both determinations.

The Fifth District affirmed on both issues. On unfitness, the court deferred to the circuit court's credibility findings, noting Father produced no documentary evidence of attempted contact, voluntarily abandoned family court proceedings despite receiving notice, provided no financial support since October 2022, and was incarcerated due to his own criminal conduct—holding his pregnant wife at gunpoint in a home invasion. The court emphasized that self-inflicted circumstances do not excuse a parent's failure to maintain interest, concern, or responsibility, and that any one of the three disjunctive elements is independently sufficient for an unfitness finding.

On best interest, the court found the statutory factors under Adoption Act section 15.1 strongly favored termination. The minor was thriving in Mother's care, had strong bonds with both petitioners, had not seen Father since approximately age one and a half, and the GAL recommended granting the petition after home visits. Attorneys handling private adoption or parental rights termination cases should note the court's treatment of self-inflicted incarceration, the sufficiency of a single disjunctive unfitness element, and the distinction between Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act best-interest factors.

In September 2019, Juan Duclerk was charged with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, a Class 4 felony, after failing to stop for officers in Coles County. Following a bench trial in April 2024—conducted in absentia—the trial court found Duclerk guilty based largely on officer testimony describing the vehicle as a 'motorized bike—moped' and photographs showing pedals, a motor, a gas tank, and other features. Duclerk was sentenced to three years' incarceration. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing the State failed to prove the motorbike qualified as a 'motor vehicle' under the Illinois Vehicle Code.

The Fifth District reversed the aggravated fleeing conviction, holding that the State presented no evidence of the motorbike's engine type, horsepower, or speed capability—facts necessary to distinguish a 'motor vehicle' from an exempt 'low-speed gas bicycle.' The court further held that the burden of proving vehicle classification, including that no statutory exception applied, rested on the State, not the defendant, relying on People v. Plank and People v. Grandadam.

Rather than outright acquitting Duclerk, the court exercised its authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) to enter a conviction on the lesser-included offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a Class A misdemeanor, finding sufficient evidence that Duclerk knowingly failed to stop for uniformed officers conducting an authorized traffic stop. The court reduced the sentence to eleven months with no mandatory supervised release and directed entry of a new mittimus.

Michael Talbert was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) following a jury trial in Cook County and sentenced to 16 years in prison. Prior to trial, Talbert moved to dismiss the indictment arguing the AHC statute was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, considered solely whether the AHC statute is facially unconstitutional under the two-step framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Applying the Bruen analysis, the court acknowledged a split among Illinois appellate districts on whether a felon's firearm possession falls within the Second Amendment's plain text at Step 1, but ultimately resolved the constitutional question at Step 2. Relying heavily on People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, and the Supreme Court's statements in Heller and Rahimi that felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful, the court held that the government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the AHC statute is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The court also emphasized that a facial challenge carries a particularly heavy burden — requiring a showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid — and that statutes are presumed constitutional. The decision reinforces a consistent line of First District authority rejecting facial Second Amendment challenges to the AHC statute and is directly useful to practitioners litigating post-Bruen firearm possession charges involving defendants with prior felony convictions.

In this small claims landlord-tenant dispute, plaintiff Wieslawa Elmesquine sued her landlord Dorota Bebenek for $10,000, alleging Bebenek unlawfully entered her apartment, discarded her personal belongings, and blocked parking spots. Following a bench trial on April 28, 2025, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered judgment for Elmesquine in the amount of $2,200 plus costs, and also ruled in Elmesquine's favor on Bebenek's counterclaim, which alleged reputational harm and emotional distress arising from an allegedly false police misconduct complaint. Bebenek appealed pro se, arguing the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court never ruled on her counterclaim.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed both judgments. The dispositive issue was Bebenek's failure to include any report of proceedings or acceptable substitute under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) or (d) in the record on appeal. Without a transcript or bystander's report, the court could not review the testimony, evidence, or arguments presented at trial. Exhibits attached to Bebenek's brief but absent from the record were likewise disregarded. The court also rejected Bebenek's claim that no ruling was issued on her counterclaim, noting the Trial Call Order expressly reflected a judgment against her after trial.

This decision reinforces the well-established Foutch principle that an appellant bears the burden of presenting a complete record, and any gap in that record is resolved against the appellant. Attorneys advising clients on appeal — particularly pro se litigants — should ensure trial transcripts or acceptable substitutes are obtained and filed before pursuing appellate review of factual findings.

Mary Lou Thomas died in April 2016, leaving a three-flat Chicago property as part of her estate. After defendant Jessica Jackson, the successor executor named in the will, repeatedly violated probate court orders, the probate court found her disqualified and appointed the Cook County Public Administrator as independent administrator on December 20, 2022. Defendant did not appeal that order. The Administrator obtained authorization to pursue eviction proceedings against defendant and her daughter, who occupied one unit of the property. The eviction court entered an order of possession in favor of the Administrator on June 9, 2025, and denied defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant appealed, arguing the probate appointment order was void and subject to collateral attack in the eviction proceedings, and that the eviction court abused its discretion in denying her motion to compel discovery.

The appellate court affirmed on both issues. On the void/voidable distinction, the court held that because the probate court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the estate proceedings, any error in the appointment order rendered it merely voidable — not void. A voidable order must be challenged by timely direct appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), which defendant failed to pursue. Her attempt to collaterally attack the appointment order in the eviction proceedings was therefore improper. The court further noted that the eviction court, as a court of limited jurisdiction conducting summary proceedings focused solely on the right of possession, lacked authority to overturn a sister court's probate order. On discovery, the court held that the Administrator's expenditures and invoices were irrelevant to the sole question before the eviction court — superior right of possession — and denial of the motion to compel was not an abuse of discretion.

This decision is significant for probate and eviction practitioners because it reinforces that jurisdictional errors must be distinguished from mere legal errors, and that parties who fail to timely appeal probate court orders cannot relitigate those orders in collateral proceedings. Eviction courts will not entertain challenges to the propriety of an administrator's appointment, and discovery in eviction proceedings is strictly limited to matters germane to the right of possession.

Dr. Demetrios Giokaris's medical license was indefinitely suspended in December 2024 for allegedly failing to report an adverse action and an investigation as required by a prior consent order. He timely petitioned to contest the suspension and, under Section L of the consent order, was entitled to a merits hearing within 30 days. An ALJ had originally scheduled that hearing for January 23, 2025, but struck it to accommodate a subpoena dispute. When Giokaris moved to reschedule, the Department objected for the first time on January 27 — arguing no hearing was needed because he had admitted the underlying facts. The following day, one day before the 30-day deadline, the ALJ denied the motion and ruled on the merits without oral argument. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the First District reversed and remanded.

The appellate court held that due process and fundamental fairness required a full and meaningful opportunity for Giokaris to present his case before his medical license remained suspended. The court found the sequence of events — in which all parties anticipated a hearing until the Department's eleventh-hour objection and the ALJ ruled within 24 hours — fundamentally unfair and 'something we cannot countenance.' The court expressly declined to reach the substantive questions of whether the Medicaid reinstatement denial constituted an 'adverse action' or whether the MQRC review constituted an 'investigation' under the consent order.

This decision is significant for practitioners representing licensed professionals in summary suspension proceedings, as it signals that courts will scrutinize procedural shortcuts that deprive licensees of a meaningful hearing, and calls for more robust procedural safeguards in such high-stakes administrative proceedings.

Vincent Davis was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) in Lake County and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The charge arose from an incident captured on surveillance video showing Davis retrieving a firearm from under a store counter, carrying it for over 20 minutes, fleeing with it, and storing it in a safe. The predicate felony was a 1991 armed robbery conviction Davis sustained at age 17, when armed robbery triggered automatic transfer to adult court under the then-applicable Juvenile Court Act. Davis appealed on four grounds: sufficiency of the predicate conviction, denial of necessity jury instructions, a Rule 431(b) voir dire violation, and excessiveness of his sentence.

The Second District affirmed on all counts. Relying on People v. Wallace, 2025 IL 130173, the court held that the 2016 amendment removing armed robbery from the Juvenile Court Act's automatic transfer provision does not retroactively invalidate Davis's 1991 conviction as a predicate felony — the UPWF statute requires only that the defendant 'has been convicted of a felony.' The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct on necessity, finding no evidence of a specific and immediate threat at the time of possession and noting that necessity is unavailable to a defendant who denies committing the charged offense. The Rule 431(b) claim failed because the evidence was overwhelming, precluding first-prong plain error, and the 14-year sentence was within the statutory range with adequate consideration of mitigating factors.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys challenging felon-in-possession charges based on older juvenile-era convictions, and for practitioners evaluating the viability of necessity defenses in weapons cases.

Plaintiffs Dearl Hawkins, Michelle Hawkins, and Coleton Downes filed suit in Marion County against neighboring defendants and law enforcement officials, asserting claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy arising from an ongoing neighbor dispute. The circuit court granted summary judgment on four counts, and plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment on all four counts.

On Count I, the court held that a sheriff's letter threatening future enforcement of a sex offender residency restriction did not constitute actual restraint sufficient to support false imprisonment, as Dearl remained able to be at his home during the day and eventually resumed full-time residence without consequence. On Count III, probable cause existed to arrest Coleton for criminal trespass based on surveillance video, a signed complainant statement, and the Hawkinses' own admissions — the relevant inquiry being facts known to police at the time of arrest, not Coleton's subjective awareness of posted signs. On Count IV, the court found probable cause for Dearl's prosecution as a sex offender present in a school zone because statutory permission required authorization from the superintendent or school board, not merely the principal. On Count VI, the invasion of privacy claim failed because the areas captured by the Coffmans' cameras — driveways and exterior property not enclosed or removed from public view — were not private matters.

This decision is significant for civil litigators handling false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intrusion upon seclusion claims, particularly regarding the boundaries of probable cause and the narrow scope of privacy protections for exterior residential areas.

Defendant Dion J. Gordon entered a fully negotiated guilty plea in 2004 to first and second degree murder offenses committed when he was 16, receiving consecutive sentences of 45 and 12 years. In 2020, he filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition asserting Eighth Amendment Miller claims and an Illinois proportionate penalties clause claim. A prior trial judge orally granted leave without making express cause-and-prejudice findings or entering a written order. After reassignment, the new trial court declined to honor that oral grant and denied a renewed motion for leave, finding defendant's constitutional sentencing challenges barred by People v. Jones. Defendant appealed, and OSAD moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, asserting no issue of arguable merit.

The appellate court affirmed on all three potential issues. First, the prior oral grant of leave was ineffective because no express cause-and-prejudice determination was made and no written order was entered, requiring the new court to conduct a fresh analysis. On the merits, Jones squarely bars defendant's claims: a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives constitutional challenges based on subsequent changes in law, and Miller does not apply where the trial court exercised discretion in accepting a negotiated plea with specific sentencing terms. Second, both appointed and retained postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance under Rule 651(c). Third, even assuming the State's participation at the leave-to-file stage was improper under Lusby, remand would be pointless given the clear failure of the cause-and-prejudice test.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys pursuing successive postconviction petitions on behalf of juvenile offenders who pleaded guilty, as it confirms that Jones forecloses Miller-based claims in that context and that oral grants of leave without written orders and express findings carry no procedural effect.

In this interlocutory appeal arising from a first degree murder prosecution in St. Clair County, the State challenged the trial court's partial suppression of the defendant's proffer statement given at a December 13, 2020 meeting. The defendant, a 19-year-old at the time of his arrest, had signed a proffer letter and made a highly incriminating statement. The trial court held the meeting constituted a plea discussion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f), rendering the statement inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief or to rebut a defense inconsistent with the statement, but permissible for impeachment if the defendant testified contrary to it at trial.

The Fifth District affirmed on both issues. Applying the two-part Friedman test, the court found the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea — evidenced by his signed acknowledgment and the incriminating nature of the statement itself — and that expectation was objectively reasonable given the State initiated the proffer, the letter described it as a step toward a plea agreement, and defense counsel was actively negotiating alternative charges. The court rejected the State's reliance on a more restrictive federal standard requiring a specific plea offer, finding it inconsistent with Illinois precedent.

On waiver, the court followed Mezzanatto in recognizing that Rule 402(f) protections can be waived, but held that waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Because defense counsel testified he only explained impeachment use to the defendant and did not himself understand the proffer letter's broader waiver provision, the defendant's knowing waiver extended no further than impeachment. The court expressly reserved judgment on whether broader Rule 402(f) waivers are permissible under different circumstances.

Anthony Steward was convicted after a jury trial in Lake County of four counts of violating an order of protection and one count of domestic battery arising from incidents on April 1 and April 2, 2024, involving his girlfriend Javata Hopes. The circuit court found him extended-term eligible and sentenced him to concurrent five-year terms. On appeal, Steward argued ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence on multiple counts, and improper extended-term sentencing.

The Second District affirmed most convictions but vacated the domestic battery count. The court held that because the body-camera footage was admitted only to show Hopes' demeanor and intoxication—not for the truth of the matter asserted—and Hopes' direct-examination testimony about being struck was entirely qualified and conditional, no competent evidence established that Steward caused her injuries. The court also affirmed the order-of-protection convictions, finding that the short-form notice directing Steward to stay away from Hopes 'at additional locations' gave adequate notice of the 500-foot stay-away provision beyond the specifically listed addresses. The court dismissed review of two merged counts for lack of jurisdiction.

Practically, this decision clarifies that Illinois courts will not extend Erlinger's jury-determination requirement to the straightforward 10-year recency inquiry under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1), and that prosecutors must ensure body-camera footage is admitted for the truth of the matter asserted—or obtain a stipulation—when it forms the evidentiary basis for a charged offense.

Following a $7.7 million judgment against defendant David Zazove, plaintiff Raymond Cahnman initiated supplemental proceedings under 735 ILCS 5/2-1402 to collect the debt. During those proceedings, the parties exchanged emails in December 2023 that defendant characterized as a binding settlement for $150,000. When the parties failed to finalize a written agreement and defendant missed the payment deadline, he moved the circuit court to enforce the settlement. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. The appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the denial of the motion to enforce the settlement constituted a final, appealable order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4), which permits appeal from final judgments or orders entered in supplemental proceedings. The court held it did not. An order is final in the supplemental proceeding context only when it puts the judgment creditor in a position to collect, forecloses collection, or definitively adjudicates rights in a specific asset. The denial here did none of those things—the supplemental proceeding continued, no asset rights were adjudicated, and the settlement dispute was merely ancillary to the enforcement action.

The court also rejected defendant's argument that the Illinois Constitution independently conferred appellate jurisdiction, reaffirming that jurisdiction is strictly defined by Supreme Court rules and that the appellant bears the burden of establishing it. Attorneys handling post-judgment enforcement matters should carefully assess whether any interlocutory order in supplemental proceedings meets the finality standard before filing a notice of appeal.

Donte Green was convicted after a bench trial of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a minor victim, D.E.G. The trial court acquitted him of one count of attempted predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced him to 36 years. Post-trial, Green filed a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, dismissed all 23 allegations without allowing Green to elaborate, and denied the motion. Green appealed on two grounds: sufficiency of the evidence for three predatory criminal sexual assault convictions and the adequacy of the Krankel inquiry.

On sufficiency, the appellate court affirmed. Although D.E.G.'s trial testimony described only two instances of mouth-to-vagina contact, her forensic interview—admitted as substantive evidence under section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—described three such instances. The court held that inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the forensic interview were credibility questions for the trier of fact, and the circuit court had expressly found D.E.G. highly credible.

On the Krankel issue, the court remanded. The circuit court dismissed all claims as trial strategy without any inquiry, and at least one claim—that counsel failed to introduce exculpatory evidence—necessarily involved matters outside the record that could not be evaluated without further development. The court held that where off-record claims exist, remand for an adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry is required, and harmless error analysis is inapplicable when the record is devoid of information about the nature of the allegations.

Kenneth Mannie, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Edge Brook Medical Clinic and Genesis FS Card Services alleging fraud and identity theft after being charged $3,500 for elective treatments he claimed were never rendered and suffering credit damage from a reported delinquent balance. After two prior dismissals with leave to amend, the circuit court dismissed his second amended complaint (SAC) with prejudice, finding it failed to state any cognizable claim. Mannie appealed, arguing the dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion and that his SAC adequately pleaded fraud and identity theft.

The First District Appellate Court affirmed on all grounds. On the fraud claim, the court applied de novo review and held that Mannie's allegations were conclusory and failed to plead the required element that Edge Brook knowingly made a false statement of material fact. On the identity theft claim, the court held that 720 ILCS 5/16-30 is a criminal statute enforceable only by the State's Attorney or Attorney General, leaving no private civil cause of action available to Mannie. As to the dismissal with prejudice, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and, noting the absence of any hearing transcript in the record, invoked Foutch v. O'Bryant to presume the circuit court acted properly.

This decision is a practical reminder that incomplete appellate records are fatal to abuse-of-discretion challenges, that fraud claims require specific, particularized pleading of each element, and that criminal statutes do not automatically create civil remedies.

In this post-dissolution appeal, Alan Buchman challenged seven orders entered by the Cook County Domestic Relations Division arising from disputes over child support, activity payments, education expenses, and attorney fees following a December 2022 order. The appellate court consolidated four separate notices of appeal. The central disputes involved whether Buchman's deliberate refusal to pay a court-ordered instanter amount constituted contempt, whether multiple attorney fee awards were proper under section 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, whether a high school parking space qualified as an education-related expense, and whether the circuit court was required to enforce a parenting coordinator's reimbursement recommendation.

The court affirmed all orders within its jurisdiction and dismissed the interim attorney fee appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that interim fee awards under section 508(a) are not final or appealable orders. On contempt, the court found that Buchman's own testimony established willful noncompliance — he consciously withheld payment because he disagreed with the court's calculations, constituting classic self-help. Section 508(b) attorney fees were deemed mandatory following the contempt finding, and immediate purge did not excuse the obligation. The court also held that a school-provided parking space listed in the school handbook was a cognizable education-related expense, and that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 909 is merely an enabling rule that does not require courts to enforce parenting coordinator recommendations.

For practicing attorneys, this decision reinforces that clients must comply with court orders even when they believe the orders are erroneous, that section 508(b) fee awards are non-discretionary upon contempt, and that motions relitigating previously resolved provisions risk sanctions for harassment and needlessly increasing litigation costs.