In 2019, Jose Aguirre was involved in an automobile accident that totaled his vehicle and hospitalized passenger Luis Mercado. Despite a policy condition precedent requiring written notice to American Alliance Casualty Company within 30 days, Aguirre waited over two years to notify the insurer. American Alliance filed a declaratory judgment action in Cook County, and the circuit court granted summary judgment in its favor, finding that the late notice precluded coverage. Mercado appealed.

The First District affirmed on all three issues. First, the court held that even a specific 30-day notice provision carries an inherent reasonableness standard, and the five-factor Livorsi framework applies to determine whether late notice constitutes a material breach. The court reasoned that strict enforcement of such provisions would unfairly deny coverage to insureds who provide late but reasonable notice, particularly given the adhesion-contract nature of personal auto policies. Second, applying all five Livorsi factors to the undisputed facts — including Aguirre's prior accident experience, his awareness of the triggering event, and his failure to take any diligent steps to confirm coverage — the court found his two-year delay unreasonable as a matter of law. Third, the court held that once notice is found patently unreasonable, no showing of prejudice to the insurer is required.

This decision is significant for coverage counsel because it clarifies that Illinois's reasonableness standard applies to fixed-day notice provisions, not just open-ended ones, while confirming that egregiously late notice forfeits coverage without a prejudice showing.

Nancy Becker-Othman was injured in a car accident and sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from State Farm. State Farm paid the full $75,000 policy limits approximately three years after the accident, before arbitration. Becker-Othman sued in Cook County Circuit Court alleging breach of contract, bad faith delay under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code, and an implied private right of action under title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code. The trial court dismissed Count III, granted summary judgment for State Farm on Counts I and II, denied additional discovery, and required Becker-Othman to pay her expert's deposition fee. The First District affirmed all rulings.

On the breach of contract claim, the court held that the policy imposed no timing requirement for payment, and neither the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing nor the reasonable expectations doctrine supplied one — the implied covenant is a rule of construction only, and the reasonable expectations doctrine applies solely where policy language is ambiguous. The section 155 claim failed because it presupposes a successful action on the policy, and State Farm's voluntary pre-arbitration payment did not constitute such success. Count III was dismissed because title 50 administrative code violations and section 154.6 of the Insurance Code create no private right of action, with enforcement vested exclusively in the Director of Insurance.

This decision is significant for insurance coverage attorneys because it clarifies that an insurer's voluntary payment of a UIM claim — even after years of delay — cannot anchor a section 155 bad faith claim absent a successful breach of contract action, and that administrative insurance regulations remain exclusively enforceable by the Department of Insurance.

In this consolidated appeal from Macon County, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights over three minor children — Ryland S., Kyzer S., and Raylee P. The circuit court found Mother unfit on two grounds: failure to maintain reasonable interest, concern, or responsibility, and failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during applicable nine-month periods under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act. The court then found termination to be in the children's best interests at a December 2025 hearing.

On appeal, the court applied the manifest weight of the evidence standard and affirmed the unfitness finding solely on the reasonable progress ground, declining to address the second ground since only one properly proven ground is required. The record showed that Mother attended only 2 of 43 field drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine and MDMA multiple times, gave birth to Ryland while both she and the infant tested positive for methamphetamine, was discharged from substance abuse and mental health services for nonengagement, and by her own admission failed to complete two-thirds of her service plan. The court also affirmed the best interest determination, noting all three children were thriving in stable placements, bonded to caregivers committed to adoption, and that the statutory best interest factors weighed heavily in favor of termination.

For practitioners, this case reinforces that persistent, documented service plan noncompliance — particularly repeated drug test failures and substance abuse treatment disengagement — will sustain an unfitness finding, and that children's strong bonds with stable, pre-adoptive caregivers will anchor a best interest determination favoring termination.

Defendant Keveen Fullwiley was convicted in 2012 of drug offenses following a jury trial in Lake County. Before trial, he sought suppression under Franks v. Delaware, arguing the search warrant affidavit contained false statements about four controlled drug purchases. The motion was denied. In 2023, during third-stage postconviction proceedings, the State disclosed chain-of-custody reports it had inadvertently withheld, revealing that one transaction's date contradicted the affidavit and that another occurred while defendant was allegedly out of state. Defendant filed a supplemental postconviction petition asserting a Brady violation, arguing the reports would have changed the outcome of the Franks hearing. The postconviction court denied relief, and defendant appealed.

The appellate court affirmed, applying the three-part Brady test. While the court found the reports were favorable to defendant and had been inadvertently suppressed, it held they were not material. Even assuming the reports would have proven that the affiant knowingly or recklessly fabricated the fourth transaction, the remaining untainted averments — describing two additional controlled purchases in which the affiant searched the informant, observed the transactions, and received cocaine-positive substances — independently established probable cause for the warrant. Excision of the tainted averments would not have voided the warrant.

This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies that a Brady claim tied to a Franks hearing requires a two-stage materiality analysis: courts must assess both whether the withheld evidence would have exposed false statements and whether the expurgated affidavit still supports probable cause. Attorneys must address both prongs to succeed.

In 2007, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services entered default administrative paternity and child support orders against DeShawn Tucker after he failed to appear for a scheduled interview. Tucker claimed he never received notice because service was made at an address where he no longer resided. In 2015, the Department modified his support obligation to $0 due to incarceration. In May 2023 — sixteen years after the original orders — Tucker filed an administrative appeal arguing the 2007 orders were void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective substitute service. The Department dismissed the appeal as untimely under the two-year statutory limitations period, and the Circuit Court of Cook County affirmed. Tucker appealed to the First District.

The appellate court affirmed on all issues. First, the Department's factual finding that Tucker resided at the served address in January 2007 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as his former girlfriend's testimony directly supported that finding. Second, and more significantly, the court held that the Department — as an administrative agency possessing only legislatively conferred authority — lacked jurisdiction to vacate its own orders outside the two-year limitations period under section 10-14.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, even if those orders were allegedly void. Unlike courts, administrative agencies do not possess inherent equitable power to vacate void orders at any time.

Presiding Justice Martin concurred specially, emphasizing that Tucker's potential due process remedy lay in seeking a declaratory judgment in circuit court — a path not barred by exhaustion doctrine when the agency is powerless to act — but Tucker failed to plead declaratory relief, filing only a complaint for administrative review. Attorneys should note that challenges to allegedly void administrative orders must be pursued through circuit court declaratory actions, not untimely administrative appeals.

The parties divorced in Cook County in 2020 with three children. All parties subsequently relocated—respondent and the children to Michigan, petitioner to Georgia. In 2024, respondent filed a motion to modify child support in Cook County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found a substantial change of circumstances, modified petitioner's support obligation upward, and ordered payment of arrearages and unreimbursed expenses. Petitioner, appearing pro se, appealed, raising challenges to Illinois jurisdiction under UIFSA, the court's modification of the dissolution judgment's true-up and receipts provisions, and the adequacy of the court's written findings supporting the modified support amount.

The appellate court affirmed on all issues. On jurisdiction, the court held that UIFSA section 205 does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, which is constitutionally conferred. Although personal jurisdiction under UIFSA requires consent when all parties reside outside Illinois, petitioner waived any objection by filing an appearance, answer, and affirmative defenses and fully participating in proceedings without raising a timely challenge under 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-6). His conduct also independently constituted affirmative consent.

On the merits, the court's analysis was largely controlled by petitioner's failure to include a report of proceedings in the appellate record. Under Foutch v. O'Bryant, the appellate court presumed the circuit court's factual findings—including that respondent submitted required receipts and that a substantial change of circumstances existed—were supported by the evidence. The court also confirmed that a substantial change in circumstances may rest solely on an increase in the supporting parent's income, and that no additional written findings are required when the court applies guideline support without deviation.

In People v. Donald, defendant Antonio Donald was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon following a jury trial in Cook County. Officer Lewis testified about a radio dispatch describing a man with short dreads and a blue jean jacket placing a gun in a book bag. Although the trial court sustained an initial hearsay objection, Lewis subsequently testified multiple times that defendant 'fit the description' and that other men did not, and the State referenced 'the description' at least five times in closing argument. Defendant did not preserve the issue in his motion for a new trial, requiring plain error review on appeal.

The First District held that a clear and obvious error occurred. The repeated references to 'the description' effectively reclaimed the initially excluded hearsay, exceeded a permissible explanation of investigative steps, and made it practically impossible for jurors to disregard the testimony. However, the court found the evidence was not closely balanced under first-prong plain error. Lewis's account was unrefuted and corroborated by body-worn camera footage, a prisoner property sheet signed by defendant, and defendant's own return to the station to retrieve the backpack. Because no genuine credibility contest existed, the error was not prejudicial and the conviction was affirmed. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no prejudice showing was possible.

For criminal defense attorneys, this case illustrates that even where hearsay error is clear, a conviction will survive plain error review if the remaining evidence is sufficiently corroborated and uncontested.

Plaintiffs Valentina Fornadel and Maria Groszew, nieces of the deceased Jewdokia Sawczenko, challenged a September 3, 2021 amendment to a land trust beneficiary designation that replaced them with defendant Rosa Kelly, Mrs. Sawczenko's daughter, shortly before Mrs. Sawczenko's death. After multiple failed pleading attempts, the Cook County Circuit Court dismissed plaintiffs' second-amended complaint with prejudice under section 2-615 and denied leave to file a third-amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed both rulings, along with a discovery stay order.

The First District affirmed on all issues. On the core undue influence question, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations — including a strained pre-February 2021 relationship and a witness's observations of Mrs. Sawczenko's incapacity on September 11–12, 2021 — failed to address her condition or defendant's conduct on September 3, 2021, the date the amendment was actually signed. The court also rejected plaintiffs' reliance on the debilitated-testator presumption from Swenson v. Wintercorn, reaffirming that the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Estate of Coffman expressly declined to recognize that presumption. The court further held that defendant merely driving Mrs. Sawczenko to the bank and asking her to sign the document was insufficient to allege that defendant overcame the decedent's free will.

For practitioners, this case underscores that undue influence pleadings must be grounded in specific facts directly connected to the moment of execution. Broad discovery requests and circumstantial allegations about general family dynamics or post-execution incapacity will not substitute for particularized factual allegations. The court also applied the Loyola factors strictly, affirming denial of a fourth amendment attempt after more than three years at the pleading stage.

Steve Lowe was convicted by a Cook County jury of armed habitual criminal (AHC) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. His predicate convictions were drug-related offenses. After the trial court denied his post-trial motions, Lowe appealed, arguing the AHC statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him as a nonviolent felon under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on both grounds, applying de novo review. On the facial challenge, the court held that felons are not among 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment, relying on repeated Supreme Court statements in Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi that the amendment protects law-abiding citizens and that felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful. Because felons fall outside the Second Amendment's scope entirely, the Bruen analytical framework does not apply. On the as-applied challenge, the court rejected the violent/nonviolent felon distinction, noting that neither Heller nor Bruen qualified the term 'felon,' and that historical colonial-era disarmament practices support broad felon prohibitions.

For criminal defense attorneys, this decision forecloses both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the AHC statute based on a defendant's nonviolent criminal history, consistent with a strong line of Illinois appellate authority.

Michael Sapp was convicted after a 1997 bench trial of first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, home invasion, and armed robbery, and was sentenced to natural life in prison. After his direct appeal was affirmed and leave to appeal denied, Sapp filed a pro se postconviction petition in December 2018 — nearly 19 years late — arguing his natural life sentence violated the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause as applied to him as a 19-year-old offender, invoking Miller v. Alabama and emerging neuroscience on adolescent brain development. The circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage, and Sapp appealed.

The appellate court affirmed on three independent grounds. First, res judicata barred Sapp's proportionate penalties claim because he raised a materially identical youth-based challenge on direct appeal in 1998; reframing the argument through Miller and new scientific literature did not transform it into a new claim. Second, the petition was untimely, and Sapp failed to show lack of culpable negligence because Miller and Montgomery address Eighth Amendment rights of offenders under 18 and do not apply to adult offenders, meaning the legal theory was available well before 2018. Third, postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance under Rule 651(c); counsel's facially valid certificate created a rebuttable presumption Sapp failed to overcome with anything beyond speculation.

This decision reinforces that Illinois courts will strictly apply res judicata and timeliness rules to Miller-inspired postconviction claims brought by young adult offenders, and that a Rule 651(c) certificate creates a strong presumption of reasonable assistance absent concrete record evidence to the contrary.

Sebastian Rodriguez was convicted of first-degree murder for a 2008 shooting he committed at age 15. After multiple rounds of appellate review driven by evolving juvenile sentencing law, the circuit court resentenced him to 45 years—20 years for first-degree murder plus a discretionary 25-year firearm enhancement. Rodriguez appealed, arguing his sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller v. Alabama and that the court failed to adequately weigh the mandatory mitigating factor concerning outside pressure and negative influences under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(2).

The First District affirmed on both issues. On the Miller claim, the court held that because the sentence was fully discretionary—with a range from 20 years to natural life and no mandatory firearm enhancement—no finding of irredeemability was constitutionally required. The sentencing court had considered all 12 statutory mitigating factors, which Illinois courts have recognized as consistent with Miller's framework, and Rodriguez was eligible for parole after 20 years. On the statutory factor claim, the court found the circuit court had explicitly addressed Rodriguez's difficult childhood, parental gang involvement, and negative home environment under both factor (2) and the overlapping factor (3). Rodriguez's objection amounted to a challenge to the weight assigned, not a failure to consider.

This case is significant for practitioners navigating post-Miller resentencing proceedings, clarifying that discretionary juvenile sentences do not require an explicit irredeemability finding and that overlapping statutory factors may satisfy multiple mitigating considerations.

Rakym Jones was convicted by a Cook County jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder arising from a 2011 shooting that permanently injured a 13-month-old child. Jones was 16 at the time of the offense and was sentenced to two consecutive 30-year terms (60 years total). On appeal, he raised four grounds: (1) improper admission of Officer Smith's testimony about Jones holding his waistband and possessing cannabis, in violation of a 2013 motion in limine ruling; (2) denial of his motion to reopen the suppression hearing to impeach Sergeant Johnson with a prior adverse credibility finding; (3) that his 60-year sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) that the sentence violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause and is otherwise excessive.

The First District affirmed on all grounds. Although it found both evidentiary rulings erroneous — the trial court improperly admitted the barred testimony and incorrectly applied trial evidentiary rules to the suppression hearing — neither error was prejudicial given two eyewitness identifications, an inculpatory statement, and ASA Hughes's independent, unimpeached suppression testimony. On sentencing, the court held that the Illinois youth parole statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)), which provides parole eligibility after 10 years with additional opportunities every five years, forecloses any de facto life sentence argument under People v. Spencer. The proportionate penalties challenge also failed given the trial court's thorough Miller-factor analysis and extensive evidence of post-incarceration misconduct negating rehabilitative potential.

This decision is significant for practitioners because it applies Spencer to firmly close the Eighth Amendment de facto life sentence avenue for juvenile offenders in Illinois, while also clarifying that Illinois Rule of Evidence 104(a) exempts suppression hearings from ordinary evidentiary rules — a point defense counsel should raise proactively when seeking to reopen suppression proofs.

Dakota Spears, a twice-convicted felon, was found in possession of 30 rounds of .22-caliber ammunition and a bulletproof vest. A Champaign County jury convicted him of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) as a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) and (e), the latter provision enhancing the offense to a 10-to-40-year sentencing range when a felon simultaneously possesses firearm ammunition and body armor. The trial court sentenced Spears to 14 years. On appeal, Spears raised four constitutional challenges: facial due process, as-applied proportionate penalties and Eighth Amendment, excessive sentence, and Second Amendment violations.

The Fifth District affirmed on all grounds. On due process, the court applied rational basis review, finding the body armor enhancement rationally related to the legislature's legitimate interest in deterring armed, armored felons. The statute was neither overbroad nor vague, and the court declined to conduct a cross-comparison penalty analysis under the guise of a due process claim. On proportionate penalties, the specific facts of Spears's case—including evidence linking him to a shooting and photographs of him wearing the vest while holding what appeared to be a firearm—demonstrated the legislature's rationale and did not shock the moral conscience. The 14-year sentence, only four years above the mandatory minimum, was not an abuse of discretion.

On the Second Amendment, the court held at Bruen step one that convicted felons are not among 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment and that the right to bear arms does not extend to body armor, declining to reach the historical tradition analysis. Defense attorneys litigating felon-in-possession or sentencing enhancement cases should note the court's firm rejection of nonviolent-felon distinctions under Bruen and its refusal to allow cross-comparison proportionality arguments to be reframed as due process claims.

Marwan Fateen claimed to have occupied a Chicago property since 2018 and paid property taxes from 2017–2022, but held no recorded ownership interest and disclaimed any ownership in his own filings. The Cook County Land Bank Authority (CCLBA) purchased the property at a 2019 Scavenger Tax Sale based on delinquent taxes for 2007–2016, and a tax deed was issued in September 2022 and recorded in 2023. Fateen filed two successive section 2-1401 petitions seeking to vacate the tax deed, alleging fraud, deception, and failure to provide required statutory notices. The circuit court dismissed both petitions, and Fateen appealed.

The First District Appellate Court affirmed on the threshold issue of standing, holding that a petitioner must hold a bona fide title or interest in the property — sufficient to confer the right to redeem — to collaterally attack a tax deed via section 2-1401. Because Fateen expressly disclaimed ownership and held only informal occupancy based on undocumented consent from the prior owner's heirs, he lacked the requisite interest. The court also noted that section 22-45(4) relief is expressly limited to parties holding a recorded ownership or other recorded interest, which Fateen did not possess. The court declined to reach the fraud, deception, or due diligence issues.

Practically, this decision reinforces that paying taxes or occupying property — without a formal, documented legal interest — is insufficient to confer standing to challenge a tax deed in Illinois, even where a party may have been entitled to notice under section 22-10.

Corinthian Condominium Association filed a forcible entry and detainer action against unit owner Padma Rao seeking possession and $3,066.65 in unpaid assessments. Rao moved for summary judgment, arguing the 30-day notice was fatally defective because it overstated the amount owed. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Corinthian was awarded possession and $2,223.69 in assessments — less than the noticed amount — and the court subsequently awarded $30,853 in attorneys' fees. Rao appealed the denial of summary judgment, the denial of her post-trial motions for JNOV or a new trial, the jury instructions, and the fee award.

The First District affirmed on all issues. On the notice question, the court held that an inaccurately stated amount does not automatically invalidate a 30-day notice under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, relying on Burnham Management Co. v. Davis and Elizondo v. Medina. Because Rao tendered no money in response to the notice, she could not establish prejudice from the overstatement. The court also upheld the jury instructions, reasoning that a plaintiff may only recover amounts proved at trial — as the verdict itself demonstrated — and that neither the Act nor caselaw requires invalidation of a notice for misstating the amount owed.

On attorneys' fees, the court rejected each of Rao's specific challenges, finding that the amended fee petition properly superseded the original, that arguments lacking supporting authority were forfeited, and that Rao's allegations of false filings were unsupported by the record. This decision provides important guidance for condominium associations and their counsel on the sufficiency of pre-suit notices and the recoverability of attorneys' fees in assessment collection litigation.

This is the fourth appeal arising from a construction dispute between general contractor Pepper Construction Co. and subcontractor Bourbon Marble, Inc. stemming from a 2004–2007 condominium build-out in Chicago. Following three prior appeals and a fee award totaling over $3.7 million, Pepper wired $4,283,621.04 to Bourbon on April 2, 2024, calculating post-judgment interest from July 28, 2022—the date the trial court entered its fee award on remand. Bourbon disputed the calculation, arguing interest should have run from May 12, 2020, the date of the original fee award that was later remanded, and served citations to discover assets. Bourbon also filed a third petition for attorney fees seeking $236,946.87 for work performed after the July 28, 2022 award. The trial court quashed the citations and denied the fee petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Bourbon appealed.

The appellate court affirmed on both issues. On the interest question, the court held that post-judgment interest under 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 begins running only when the amount owed is 'certain' and the debtor has had improper use of the money. Because the prior remand left the entire question of prevailing party status—and thus whether any fees were owed at all—unresolved, the judgment was not certain until July 28, 2022. The court distinguished cases where remand involved only a ministerial recalculation or a reduction in a liability already established. On the fee petition, the court held that satisfaction of the judgment terminated the supplementary proceeding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f), and that the law-of-the-case doctrine, based on the Pepper III court's express statement that 'at some point the escalating fees must come to an end,' precluded further fee proceedings that Bourbon failed to challenge through rehearing or a petition for leave to appeal.

This decision is significant for attorneys litigating fee-shifting disputes and post-judgment collection matters. It clarifies that when a remand leaves liability—not merely the amount—unresolved, post-judgment interest does not relate back to the original judgment date. It also underscores that supplementary proceedings end upon satisfaction of judgment and that appellate pronouncements limiting further proceedings carry binding law-of-the-case effect in subsequent appeals.

Scott Bogot and Nancy Dougan, condominium owners in a Glenview planned development, filed a class action against the Haverford Homeowners Association and its board members challenging the enforceability of assessments and the association's organizational structure. After a series of dismissals in the Circuit Court of Cook County, plaintiffs appealed four rulings: dismissal of their claims that assessments were unlawful (covenant does not run with the land), that assessments were unconscionable, that board members breached fiduciary duties, and that the association's structure violated the Common Interest Community Association Act (CICAA).

The First District affirmed all four rulings. On the covenant question, the court held that the touch-and-concern requirement is satisfied when a covenant affects the use, value, and enjoyment of the land — the relevant inquiry is the covenant's relationship to the land, not whether owners actually exercise their right to use common areas. On unconscionability, the court found that an equal-per-unit assessment formula is not substantively unconscionable where all owners share equal rights to use the community area, and plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient procedural unconscionability. On standing, the court held that misappropriation of association funds is an injury to the association itself, requiring a derivative action; plaintiffs' alleged harm as individual owners was merely indirect. On the CICAA claim, the court held that defendants qualify as a master association under the plain language of the Condominium Property Act and are therefore governed by that Act, not the CICAA — and the declaration's own contrary characterization cannot override the statute.

This decision provides important guidance for HOA and real estate attorneys on the enforceability of assessment covenants, the limits of unconscionability challenges to declaration terms, the derivative-versus-direct action distinction in association disputes, and the interplay between the Condominium Property Act and the CICAA in mixed planned developments.

Carl Arcangel filed a putative class action in Cook County against Yardi Systems, Inc., alleging that Yardi's 3.5% credit card surcharge on rent payments made through its RentCafe platform violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted unjust enrichment, because the fee allegedly exceeded the 3% cap permitted under Visa's merchant rules. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under section 2-615, finding the disclosed fee and the availability of a fee-free payment alternative defeated plaintiff's claims. The First District affirmed.

The appellate court held that both the deception and unfairness prongs of plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act claim impermissibly reduced to a breach of contract theory — specifically, Yardi's alleged violation of the Visa Rules — without any independent basis for consumer harm. The court extended the established principle that a bare breach of contract is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act to third-party contracts, reasoning that plaintiff, at most an incidental beneficiary of the Visa Rules, could not derive a statutory consumer fraud claim solely from their breach. On deception, the court found no duty for merchants to disclose third-party contract terms, and no affirmative misrepresentation in Yardi's fee disclosure. On unfairness, the availability of a fee-free bank account autopay option defeated any oppressiveness argument. The unjust enrichment claim failed derivatively.

This decision is significant for class action defense counsel and consumer protection practitioners: it forecloses using alleged violations of payment network rules as a standalone predicate for Consumer Fraud Act liability and reinforces that disclosed fees paired with meaningful free alternatives will generally defeat both deception and unfairness claims.

Patrick Comi was convicted in 1995 following a jury trial of aggravated battery with a firearm upon a peace officer, attempted first degree murder, and armed robbery, and sentenced to 90 years in prison for offenses committed when he was 21 years old. In 2020, Comi sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his sentence constituted an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under both the Eighth Amendment and Illinois's proportionate penalties clause, relying on evolving brain science regarding adolescent and emerging-adult development. The circuit court granted leave, advanced the petition to the second stage, but ultimately dismissed it. Comi appealed.

The First District affirmed. On the Eighth Amendment claim, the court held that Miller v. Alabama applies exclusively to offenders under 18, foreclosing relief for Comi at age 21. On the proportionate penalties claim, the court held that Comi failed to establish 'cause' under the cause-and-prejudice test required for successive petitions. Binding Illinois Supreme Court precedent establishes that emerging-adult proportionate penalties claims based on evolving brain science are extensions of claims that always existed under Illinois law, meaning Miller and related neuroscience provided only 'helpful support' for a preexisting claim—insufficient to constitute cause. The court expressed sympathy for Comi's position but held it was bound by precedent.

For practitioners, this decision confirms that the window for emerging-adult defendants to raise proportionate penalties claims in successive postconviction petitions is effectively closed under current Illinois Supreme Court precedent, and that such claims should be raised at the earliest opportunity in initial petitions or on direct appeal.

Roberto Estrada was convicted of four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to two consecutive eight-year terms. After his direct appeal was affirmed, he filed a pro se postconviction petition. Following earlier appellate proceedings that remanded for second-stage review, appointed postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and adopted all pro se claims. The circuit court dismissed two claims at the second stage — that trial counsel failed to introduce an exculpatory video and failed to consult with or call a DNA expert — and Estrada appealed, arguing postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance on both claims.

The appellate court affirmed both dismissals. On the video claim, the court held that because the DVD was part of the trial record and in the circuit clerk's possession, counsel's averment that he examined all exhibits in the clerk's possession satisfied Rule 651(c). Because Estrada failed to include the video in the appellate record, the court applied Foutch v. O'Bryant and resolved all doubts against him, finding no basis to presume the video was exculpatory. On the DNA expert claim, the court held that postconviction counsel had no duty to formulate a new, more specific claim where the pro se petition failed to identify any particular expert, explain the significance of potential testimony, or show how such testimony would benefit the defense.

For postconviction practitioners, this decision reinforces that a Rule 651(c) certificate raises a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance that the petitioner bears the burden to overcome, and that counsel is not obligated to independently develop vague, undeveloped claims lacking specific factual support from the petitioner.