Tyrone Brewer was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 80 years in prison for an offense committed when he was approximately 18 years and 5 months old. After his direct appeal and initial postconviction petition failed, Brewer sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his sentence was unconstitutional as applied under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. The circuit court ultimately dismissed his supplemental petition following the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Dorsey (2021) and People v. Moore (2023), and Brewer appealed.

The First District affirmed on all grounds. First, the court held that Dorsey and Moore foreclosed Miller v. Alabama as a source of legal 'cause' for emerging adult proportionate penalties clause claims, implicitly overruling the prior appellate finding in Brewer II. Second, the court refused to consider Brewer's factual cause argument based on a 2022 neuroscience White Paper because it was submitted for the first time on appeal rather than to the circuit court. The court also noted the science remained unsettled. Third, the court found postconviction remand counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance, as counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and submitted rehabilitative evidence consistent with the existing legal framework.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys because it confirms that emerging adults face substantial procedural barriers in successive postconviction litigation, that scientific evidence supporting as-applied sentencing claims must be developed at the circuit court level, and that Miller provides no cause for such claims regardless of the petitioner's age at the time of the offense.

Defendant Dabrona Alzebdieh was convicted after a jury trial in McLean County of retail theft under 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1), sentenced to 18 months of conditional discharge, and ordered to pay $193.70 in restitution. The sole contested issue at trial was identity — specifically, whether defendant was the woman captured on Meijer surveillance footage committing the theft with her husband, Nidal Alzebdieh. Two witnesses, loss prevention officer Tyler Monteer and Officer Brittany Evans, identified defendant from the footage and a still photograph. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admissibility of the identification testimony, and the effectiveness of her trial counsel.

The Fourth District affirmed on all three issues. On sufficiency, the court held the jury was entitled to credit Monteer and Evans over the defense's implausible narrative — that an unidentified woman named 'Nina' committed the theft and drove away in defendant's own vehicle. On admissibility, reviewed for plain error due to forfeiture, the court found no clear or obvious error because both witnesses possessed familiarity with defendant beyond what the jury had: both observed defendant's distinctive gait in the courthouse hallway, and Monteer had watched the complete surveillance video. This additional familiarity rendered their testimony helpful under Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 and the People v. Thompson framework. A Thompson hearing was not required because no party requested one.

On ineffective assistance, the court applied Strickland and found counsel was not deficient because the identification testimony was properly admissible — counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to lodge a meritless objection. This case is significant for its practical guidance on when lay witness identification of surveillance footage crosses from permissible opinion into improper narration, and on the prerequisites for triggering a Thompson hearing.

Defendant Uladzimir Marozau was convicted after a bench trial of three counts of home invasion and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Post-trial, new counsel filed a supplemental motion for a new trial alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present an insanity defense. Notably, new counsel expressly disclaimed any challenge to defendant's fitness to stand trial. After being found unfit for sentencing, restored to fitness, and sentenced to 18 years, defendant appealed the denial of the new trial motion and the denial of his motion for a retrospective fitness hearing.

The Second District affirmed on all issues. On ineffective assistance, the court applied the Strickland two-prong test and found trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to pursue a consent-to-enter defense rather than an insanity defense. On prejudice, the court found no reasonable probability of a different outcome because defendant's conduct — avoiding his own phone and car, entering in early morning hours, and using a back door — demonstrated he understood his conduct was criminal. The court credited Dr. Hanlon's opinion over Dr. Anast's, noting defendant's cocaine use undermined Dr. Anast's conclusions.

On the retrospective fitness hearing, the court found no abuse of discretion. The trial judge had observed defendant for approximately two hundred hours, trial counsel testified he saw no fitness issue, and post-trial counsel had affirmatively disclaimed a fitness challenge. The court found defendant's mental state deteriorated after trial rather than reflecting a pre-existing condition that rendered him unfit during proceedings.

Alice D., a minor, was taken into DCFS custody in February 2023. After DNA testing excluded the named putative father, the State served 'any and all unknown fathers' by publication and obtained a default order terminating their parental rights in November 2024. Michael J., who later confirmed paternity through DNA testing, filed a section 2-1401 motion to vacate, alleging he had been deceived by the mother into believing another man was the biological father. The circuit court denied the motion, finding a diligent inquiry had been conducted and that Father failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence. Father appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the State's inquiry—limited solely to asking the mother to identify possible fathers—fell far short of the diligent inquiry required by section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act before resorting to service by publication. Relying on In re C.K. and DCFS Administrative Procedure No. 22, the court found the State was also required to review agency and court files and to question available relatives, including the maternal grandparents who served as foster parents and had ongoing DCFS contact. Because the State failed to conduct a diligent inquiry, the circuit court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, rendering the default termination order void ab initio.

The court further held that because the order was void, Father was not required to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence under section 2-1401—the allegation of voidness substitutes for those requirements. This decision is significant for practitioners navigating termination proceedings involving unknown or unlocated fathers, as it establishes that publication service requires meaningful investigative steps beyond a single inquiry to the mother.

Madhavi Ryali and Sunit Singla are divorced parents of two minor children governed by a 2018 Allocation Judgment. Following Madhavi's petitions to modify parenting arrangements and Sunit's petition for rule to show cause, the Du Page County circuit court held a five-day trial and issued a December 2024 ruling granting Madhavi sole decision-making authority, suspending Sunit's parenting time indefinitely, permitting enrollment of the younger child in private school, and denying Sunit's contempt petition. Sunit appealed all rulings to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issues on appeal were whether the modifications were against the manifest weight of the evidence, whether the trial court erred in denying Sunit's contempt petition, and whether various recordings were improperly admitted or considered. The appellate court affirmed on all issues. Under Section 603.10(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the court found sufficient evidence of serious endangerment, including Sunit swearing at and physically intimidating the children, causing one child to urinate on herself and the other to threaten self-harm. The GAL, therapists, custody evaluator, and reunification counselor all recommended restrictions. On contempt, the court held Madhavi's noncompliance was not willful because professionals advised her not to force the children to attend parenting time.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that credibility determinations and professional recommendations carry substantial weight in parenting time modification proceedings, and that a custodial parent may defeat a contempt finding by demonstrating reliance on therapist and GAL guidance. The court also clarified that evidentiary errors involving recordings are subject to harmless error analysis where the trial court expressly declined to rely on the disputed evidence.

Following a jury trial in Kane County, Kamron Garraway was convicted of one count of resisting or obstructing a peace officer and sentenced to 24 months of probation, while being acquitted on two other charges. After trial, Garraway filed a pro se post-trial motion under People v. Krankel alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically claiming that counsel failed to cross-examine Officer Young about the timing of his medical treatment and failed to call expert witnesses on causation of the officer's shoulder injury. The trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, denied the motion, and sentenced defendant. Garraway appealed, arguing the preliminary inquiry was inadequate.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed. The court held that the preliminary inquiry was adequate because Garraway's claims were specific and articulate, counsel's in-court performance was directly observable by the trial court, and the record supported a finding that the challenged decisions were matters of reasonable trial strategy. The court reasoned that aggressive cross-examination on the injury delay could have antagonized the jury and elicited greater sympathy for the officer, and that calling an expert could have drawn undue attention to the injury. Garraway also failed to identify what specific testimony any expert would have offered, rendering further inquiry purposeless.

For practicing attorneys, this decision clarifies that a Krankel inquiry is adequate when the trial court has sufficient information to evaluate the claim, counsel's in-court conduct is at issue, and the challenged decisions reflect apparent strategic rationale. Defense counsel need not articulate reasons for strategy when those reasons are readily apparent from the record.

Emma Nyssen filed a petition for a stalking no contact order against Shahryar Zarrinmehr in the Circuit Court of Cook County. After an emergency order was entered and extended multiple times, the trial court entered a plenary stalking no contact order on November 5, 2025, prohibiting Zarrinmehr from contacting Nyssen, approaching her residence or workplace within 100 feet, and possessing a FOID card or firearms. Zarrinmehr appealed pro se, challenging the trial court's factual findings underlying the plenary order.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed on two independent grounds. First, Zarrinmehr's brief failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h): his statement of facts contained argument rather than a fair recitation of the record, and he cited no legal authorities whatsoever. The court emphasized that supreme court rules are not mere suggestions and that pro se status confers no procedural leniency. Second, and dispositive, Zarrinmehr failed to include a report of proceedings from the November 5, 2025 hearing, and provided no acceptable substitute such as a bystander's report or agreed statement of facts under Rule 323. Applying Foutch v. O'Bryant, the court presumed the trial court's order conformed with law and had a sufficient factual basis.

This case is a practical reminder that appellate success depends on record preservation and strict compliance with briefing rules. Attorneys representing clients in protection order proceedings should ensure a complete transcript is ordered and that appellate briefs fully comply with Rule 341(h) requirements.

In In re A.E., the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for minors A.E. and C.D. in Cook County, alleging neglect based on an injurious environment and abuse based on a substantial risk of physical injury following a June 2024 incident in which respondent-mother S.E. allegedly choked A.E. The juvenile court found the minors abused and neglected, adjudged them wards of the court, and denied respondent's motions to compel the minors to testify or be deposed. Respondent appealed both the adjudicatory findings and the denial of her motion to compel testimony.

On the sufficiency of evidence, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the minors' out-of-court statements were admissible under section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act and mutually corroborated each other — both reported respondent choked A.E., and bruising was observed on A.E.'s upper lip. The court rejected respondent's argument that physical evidence of choking was required, finding the abuse statute demands only a substantial risk of physical injury. Respondent's extensive DCFS history — 25 investigations, all 11 children removed, and prior abuse findings involving these same minors — was properly considered under section 2-18(3).

On the motion to compel testimony, the court affirmed the trial court's denial, emphasizing that the Juvenile Court Act prioritizes children's best interests over parental litigation interests. Given both minors' documented histories of suicidal ideation, trauma, and emotional dysregulation, their unwillingness to testify, and the availability of their prior statements, compelling testimony would have caused undue harm. Practitioners should note that prior DCFS history and corroborating out-of-court statements can independently sustain abuse and neglect findings, and that courts retain broad discretion to shield traumatized minors from compelled testimony.

This consolidated appeal arose from a Cook County probate guardianship proceeding involving Nora Kornesczuk, an aging woman whose children disagreed about her placement in a residential care facility. After the trial court ordered placement and that ruling was affirmed on appeal, the guardian ad litem (GAL) filed two separate fee petitions. In both instances, the trial court allocated a disproportionate share of the GAL's fees to respondent-appellant James Kornesczuk (Jim), finding that his objections and continued litigation were the sole cause of the GAL's reappointment and the resulting fees. Jim appealed both allocation orders, arguing abuse of discretion, impermissible sanctioning, arbitrariness, and denial of evidentiary hearings.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed both orders. The court held that Section 11a-10 of the Probate Act vests trial courts with broad discretion to allocate GAL fees, and that which party caused the need for those fees is a recognized and proper consideration. Because Jim's actions alone prompted the GAL's reappointment, allocating a greater share of fees to him was not an abuse of discretion and did not constitute a sanction. The court also rejected Jim's evidentiary hearing arguments, noting that in both proceedings the trial court expressly offered him the opportunity to present evidence or submit written objections, and his counsel declined each time.

For probate and guardianship practitioners, this decision confirms that Illinois courts may look beyond equal division when allocating GAL fees, particularly where one party's litigation conduct is the primary driver of those costs. Attorneys should advise clients that prolonged, unsuccessful opposition in guardianship proceedings can result in disproportionate fee liability, and that declining an offered evidentiary hearing forfeits that argument on appeal.

Regina and Darryl Thomas divorced after a lengthy marriage. Following a bench trial in Cook County, the circuit court divided Regina's CTA pension and the equity in her Matteson home equally between the parties, denied maintenance, and ordered mediation on visitation. Regina appealed, challenging the property allocation. Darryl did not file a response brief, and the appellate court resolved the case on Regina's brief alone. Before reaching the merits, the court confirmed its jurisdiction, holding that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272, the 30-day appeal period triggered by the filing of the signed judgment order with the circuit court clerk—not the date the judge signed it. Because the order was clerk-filed on November 6, 2024, and Regina noticed her appeal on December 6, 2024, the appeal was timely.

On the merits, the court applied the Section 503(d) factors of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. It affirmed the trial court's finding that both parties contributed to the marital estate—Darryl's non-financial contributions enabling Regina to work full-time and earn her pension—but found an abuse of discretion in the equal split. The trial court failed to adequately account for the fact that Regina is the sole caregiver and financial provider for Junior, their disabled adult son who cannot live independently, while Darryl bears none of that burden. Invoking Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), the appellate court modified the judgment directly, awarding Regina two-thirds and Darryl one-third of both the pension and home equity. The court declined to order a separate trust for Junior, treating the adjusted property division as the appropriate remedy.

This decision is significant for family law practitioners because it confirms that a disabled adult child's ongoing care needs are a cognizable factor in marital property division under Section 503(d), and that appellate courts may modify—rather than merely remand—inequitable property allocations when the record is sufficient.

Following a bench trial in Peoria County, Christopher James Shea was convicted of failure to report a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal injury and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. At the postsentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that defendant did not wish to challenge the sentence and wanted a notice of appeal filed immediately. The circuit court then incorrectly advised defendant that by immediately filing a notice of appeal, he would forfeit his right to challenge the sentence — and found that defendant had willingly waived that right. Defendant appealed, arguing the admonition was legally erroneous.

The Fourth District agreed the admonition was incorrect. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 605(a)(3)(B) and 606(b), immediately filing a notice of appeal does not preclude a defendant from also filing a timely postsentencing motion within the 30-day window. Had defendant done so, the notice of appeal would have been stricken, the circuit court would have ruled on the motion, and defendant could have filed a new notice of appeal preserving sentencing challenges. No waiver occurs merely by filing a notice of appeal promptly.

Despite the legal error, the court affirmed, finding no prejudice warranting remand. Applying People v. Henderson, remand is required only where inadequate admonishments cause actual prejudice or a denial of real justice. Because defense counsel unequivocally stated defendant did not wish to challenge the sentence — and defendant personally confirmed this — the incorrect advice about a right defendant had already chosen not to exercise was harmless. The court declined to speculate that defendant might have reconsidered during the 30-day period.

Jerome Vonner was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses arising from the 1992 shooting death of Greg Hersey and sentenced to 55 years. After exhausting direct appeal and an initial post-conviction petition, Vonner filed a successive post-conviction petition claiming actual innocence. The circuit court granted leave to file, appointed counsel, and ordered DNA testing of Vonner's clothing. Following testing and supplemental filings, a third-stage evidentiary hearing was held in March 2024. The circuit court denied relief, finding Vonner failed to present new, reliable evidence of a conclusive character that would probably change the verdicts. Vonner appealed.

The appellate court affirmed under the manifest error standard. On the DNA evidence, the court acknowledged that the absence of the victim's blood on Vonner's clothing was marginally favorable, but found its probative value minimal because the medical examiner characterized the wound as a distant gunshot, making bloodless clothing unsurprising. On the hearsay evidence — affidavits from two longtime friends of Vonner relaying purported confessions by a third party through intermediate declarants who never testified — the court found the circuit court did not manifestly err in assigning no weight. The court cited the double hearsay structure, lack of corroborating circumstances establishing trustworthiness, the affiants' bias and suspicious similarities in their affidavits, and the unexplained absence of the intermediate declarants.

Practically, this decision reinforces that post-conviction actual-innocence claims require genuinely conclusive new evidence. Attorneys pursuing such claims must establish the reliability and admissibility of each layer of hearsay and should anticipate that unexplained absence of key declarants will significantly undermine credibility findings at the third stage.

Omar Dixon was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated battery with a firearm and related offenses, receiving a 40-year sentence. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2012. In 2019, Dixon filed a postconviction petition alleging actual innocence, supported by affidavits from three witnesses — April Sanders, Bryant Madison, and Marshon Kuntu — who purportedly corroborated his self-defense claim. After the petition advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing in August 2023, the postconviction court denied relief, finding the new evidence lacked conclusive character. Dixon appealed.

The central issue was whether the postconviction court's denial was manifestly erroneous. The appellate court affirmed, finding the court's credibility determinations well-supported. At the evidentiary hearing, all three witnesses were impeached by their own prior affidavits, which were far more specific than their live testimony. Critically, none testified that they saw Dixon take a gun from an assailant or that the other men fired first — the very facts their affidavits had asserted. The physical evidence, including six .45-caliber cartridge casings clustered near Dixon's position and a positive gunshot residue test, further undermined his account. Multiple trial witnesses had testified Dixon was armed and fired first, and the trial court had credited that testimony.

For practitioners, this case reinforces that actual innocence claims at the third stage rise or fall on witness credibility, and that new witnesses whose live testimony retreats from their affidavits will rarely satisfy the conclusive character requirement. Attorneys should ensure postconviction witnesses can testify consistently and specifically to the facts asserted in supporting affidavits.

Montez Anderson was convicted in 2012 of attempt (first degree murder) and armed robbery with a firearm, committed when he was 18 years old, and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 49 years. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and a summarily dismissed initial postconviction petition, Anderson sought leave in 2024 to file a successive postconviction petition through retained counsel, arguing that newly available neuroscientific research on young adult brain development provided cause for his failure to raise an Eighth Amendment and proportionate penalties clause challenge in earlier proceedings. The circuit court denied leave, relying on People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, and the appellate court affirmed.

The central issue on appeal was whether previously unavailable neuroscientific research on young adult brain development constitutes an objective factor external to the defense sufficient to establish 'cause' under the cause-and-prejudice test. The court held it does not. Relying on Moore, Clark, Haines, and French, the court reasoned that Illinois law had long recognized developmental differences between young adults and older adults, meaning a proportionate penalties clause claim was always raisable in some form using defendant's own age, background, and personal history. The emergence of stronger scientific support for an already-raisable claim is not cause. The court also rejected defendant's reliance on Blalock, Prante, Robinson, and Mitchell as inapposite or factually distinguishable.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that the unavailability of better supporting evidence — including evolving neuroscience — will not satisfy the cause prong where the underlying claim was previously buildable. Defense attorneys pursuing successive petitions on young adult sentencing grounds must identify a truly external, previously unobtainable impediment beyond incremental scientific development.

Plaintiff Qusai Alkafaween filed a civil tort action against the Village of New Lenox and two of its police officers after he was struck by a car following a late-night drop-off in an unfamiliar area. Officers had responded to a trespass complaint at Silver Cross Hospital and, rather than arresting plaintiff, transported him to a location near the county line. The trial court granted summary judgment for the New Lenox defendants, finding the officers had transitioned to a community caretaking function triggering absolute immunity under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issue was whether the officers were providing police protection services under section 4-102 (absolute immunity) or executing and enforcing the law under section 2-202 (limited immunity, with a willful and wanton conduct exception). The appellate court reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to which provision applied. The court identified competing evidence on both sides: facts suggesting community caretaking (no arrest, calm tone, assurances of assistance) and facts suggesting law enforcement activity (dispatched on a trespass complaint, physically blocking re-entry, transporting plaintiff to a location of the officers' choosing, and an officer describing the act as 'dumping' plaintiff near the county line). The court also declined to apply general discretionary immunity under section 2-201, finding sections 4-102 and 2-202 more specifically addressed the conduct at issue.

For practitioners, this decision underscores that the characterization of police conduct as community caretaking versus law enforcement is ordinarily a question of fact not resolvable on summary judgment when the record supports competing inferences. Attorneys litigating municipal immunity cases should carefully develop the factual record regarding the nature and purpose of officer conduct at each stage of an encounter.

Following the 2019 dissolution of the Moros' marriage, Monika Moro filed multiple post-dissolution motions and petitions seeking back pay of calculated child support and maintenance, contempt findings, and enforcement of a college expense order. The Du Page County circuit court dismissed all of Monika's filings, concluding that prior orders from June 12, 2024, and July 23, 2024 — which set a $24,000 contempt purge amount and subsequently found that purge satisfied — were dispositive under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(4) and barred further litigation of past due support amounts. Monika appealed.

The Third District reversed, finding that the prior orders did not constitute final rulings on the total past due child support and maintenance amounts. The record showed the June 12, 2024, order directed Monika to calculate the exact amount owed and reserved a future ruling, and the case was transferred to a new courtroom before that determination was ever made. Because no final ruling on the past due amounts existed, the prior orders could not serve as a bar under section 2-619(4). The court also found the college expense petition could not logically be barred by orders that never addressed college expenses. However, the court forfeited additional arguments in Monika's brief that were presented without cohesive legal authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7).

For family law practitioners, this decision clarifies that a satisfied contempt purge order does not automatically resolve the underlying question of total arrears, and courts must make an express final ruling on past due amounts before those issues are foreclosed.

Shawn Kubina was charged in Fayette County with aggravated criminal sexual abuse and battery in August 2021. The State later filed two counts of criminal sexual assault in March 2023, with a grand jury indictment following in January 2024. Trial commenced days later; the State dismissed the original charges and proceeded solely on the sexual assault counts. The jury convicted Kubina on both counts, the court merged them, and sentenced him to eight years. On appeal, Kubina argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written speedy trial demand, which — under compulsory joinder principles — would have triggered the 160-day statutory clock and potentially required dismissal of the later-filed sexual assault charges if filed outside that window.

The Fifth District assumed without deciding that counsel's failure to file a written demand satisfied Strickland's performance prong, but found the prejudice prong dispositive. The court held that Kubina's argument was impermissibly speculative because it rested entirely on the assumption that the State would have filed the additional charges beyond 160 days regardless of a written demand. The court emphasized that a defendant must affirmatively prove a reasonable probability of a different outcome — not merely identify a conceivable effect — and that nothing in the record suggested the State would have failed to act within the statutory period had a demand been filed.

This decision reinforces that ineffective assistance claims premised on an opponent's hypothetical inaction face a high prejudice burden. Defense counsel advancing similar speedy trial or compulsory joinder IAC arguments must develop a factual record demonstrating why the State would not have adjusted its strategy in response to a timely demand.

Cleother Tidwell, a pro se inmate at Menard Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Randolph County circuit court against two correctional officers, alleging they physically attacked him while he was handcuffed on April 27, 2021. Only defendant Brandon Edwards was served. Edwards moved to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, asserting failure to state a claim (§ 2-615), failure to exhaust administrative remedies (§ 2-619(a)(9)), and sovereign immunity (§ 2-619(a)(1)). The circuit court granted the motion with prejudice, and later denied Tidwell's motion for reconsideration. Tidwell appealed both rulings.

The Fifth District affirmed on all grounds. On the § 2-615 issue, the court held that Tidwell's complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to identify any deprivation of a property or liberty interest — an essential element of a § 1983 claim — and offered only conclusory allegations. On the § 2-619(a)(9) issue, the court held that Tidwell failed to demonstrate administrative finality because, while he appealed an untimely August 2021 grievance (which was rejected as untimely), he never claimed to have appealed his timely April 27, 2021 grievance to the Administrative Review Board, and no record evidence showed such an appeal. The court declined to reach the sovereign immunity argument as unnecessary.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that Illinois state courts apply the same rigorous pleading and exhaustion requirements to prisoner § 1983 claims as federal courts. Attorneys advising inmate plaintiffs must ensure both that complaints specifically allege a cognizable constitutional deprivation and that all timely grievances are fully appealed through the ARB before filing suit.

Dr. Kermit Muhammad, an orthopedic and hand surgeon with clinical privileges at Riverside Healthcare, filed suit after Riverside took adverse action against his privileges when he sought a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccination policy. His third amended complaint alleged breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional interference with employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit court dismissed all counts with prejudice, finding statutory immunity under section 10.2 of the Hospital Licensing Act, mootness as to the breach of contract count, and failure to state a claim on the remaining counts. The Third District reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The appellate court reversed on immunity and mootness. Applying Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a sham peer review purpose — specifically, that defendants used the COVID-19 vaccination policy as a pretext to divert his hand surgery patients to a competing Riverside Medical Group surgeon, supported by specific volume statistics showing a 408-surgery increase for the competitor. The breach of contract count was not moot because plaintiff still sought monetary damages tied to mandatory adverse-action reporting obligations that would affect his insurance rates and practice going forward.

The court affirmed dismissal of the remaining counts. Tortious interference failed because plaintiff did not allege binding contracts with patients or referring physicians, and past relationships alone do not establish a reasonable expectancy of future business. The intentional interference with employment contract claim failed because plaintiff did not plead specific facts showing CEO Kambic acted outside his qualified privilege as a corporate officer. The intentional infliction claim failed for insufficient allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress. Attorneys litigating physician credentialing disputes should note that detailed, fact-specific allegations of competitive patient-diversion can overcome statutory peer review immunity at the pleading stage.

In People v. Sawyer IV, defendant John Sawyer IV was convicted after a bench trial in Cook County of violating an order of protection and sentenced to one year of court supervision along with fines and fees totaling $739. On appeal, defendant argued he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor stated during closing argument, 'I have an iPhone, your Honor. You cannot send links through talk-to-text,' a comment based on the prosecutor's personal experience rather than the evidentiary record. Defendant also argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the comment and preserve the issue for appeal. Because defendant neither objected at trial nor filed a posttrial motion, the First District reviewed only for plain error.

The court held that no reversible error occurred, and therefore no plain error could exist. Although the prosecutor's remark was improper in isolation, the court found it was an isolated comment following proper argument grounded in testimony from two witnesses who stated they could not send links via talk-to-text on their iPhones. The comment was also likely provoked by defense counsel's own improper personal-experience arguments. In a bench trial, courts presume the judge disregarded improper argument absent affirmative record evidence of prejudice, and the trial court's guilty finding rested on the content of the text messages themselves.

The ineffective assistance claim failed on Strickland's prejudice prong because the court had already determined the comment caused no prejudice. Attorneys should note that in bench trials, forfeited prosecutorial misconduct claims face a high bar, and IAC claims tied to non-prejudicial errors will not survive without a showing of outcome-determinative harm.