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2026 IL App (1st) 261460 No. 2026 IL App (1st) 261460

Paris v. Chicago Transit Authority

Rule 23 Civil Property Law

Filed
Monday, August 10, 2026
Docket
2026 IL App (1st) 261460
Citation
2026 IL App (1st) 261460
Status
Rule 23 — nonprecedential

Holdings

  • Public ownership of land alone does not defeat adverse possession; only actual public use of the specific parcel bars the 20-year prescriptive period.
  • A TRO restraining removal of vehicles/structures on disputed land can satisfy section 11-101's specificity requirement via addresses, legal descriptions, and exhibits.
  • Useful for real estate and municipal litigators handling adverse possession claims against transit authorities or other public entities over underused public land.

Summary

Plaintiffs, owners and residents of property near CTA elevated tracks, sued after the CTA announced plans to remove vehicles and structures from land beneath the tracks that plaintiffs had long used for parking and other purposes. Plaintiffs asserted adverse possession, sought a declaratory judgment and prescriptive easement, and obtained a 10-day TRO from the circuit court enjoining the CTA from towing vehicles or demolishing structures, while ordering plaintiffs to escrow parking revenue. The CTA and its codefendant appealed the TRO under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) and (d).

The First District affirmed. It first confirmed jurisdiction because the notice of appeal and Rule 307(d) petition were timely filed after the TRO issued. On the merits, the court held plaintiffs' complaint and exhibits—which included specific addresses and a legal description of the disputed land—provided sufficient particularity to distinguish the case from Capstone and support a fair question of a protectible property right. The court also held the TRO's scope, limited to a specific geographic area and specific prohibited acts (towing, demolition), satisfied section 11-101's particularity requirement and properly preserved the status quo. On likelihood of success, the court clarified that public ownership of land does not automatically defeat adverse possession; only actual public use of the specific parcel does, and here there was a fair question whether the land beneath (as distinct from) the tracks had been used publicly for 20 years. Finally, the court found irreparable harm and lack of an adequate legal remedy were adequately shown through allegations of continuous trespass and interference with ongoing parking business relationships.

For practitioners, this decision is significant for real property and municipal litigation involving adverse possession or prescriptive easement claims against government-owned infrastructure, clarifying that non-use of publicly owned land—even land adjacent to actively used public infrastructure—can support a fair question of adverse possession sufficient to sustain preliminary injunctive relief.

In short

1) Public ownership of land does not per se defeat an adverse possession claim; the relevant inquiry is whether the specific parcel was actually used for a public purpose. 2) A TRO identifying a defined geographic area, specific plaintiff addresses, and a legal description satisfies section 11-101's particularity requirement even without itemizing which plaintiff built which structure. 3) Continuous trespass to real property and interference with ongoing business/parking relationships can constitute irreparable harm not fully remediable by money damages, supporting TRO relief. 4) A Rule 307(d) petition and notice of appeal filed within the prescribed time after entry of a TRO confer appellate jurisdiction to review the TRO.

This summary was drafted by AI and verified against the slip opinion. It may contain errors and is not legal advice — always read the original before relying on it.