In this private adoption proceeding, Mother and her aunt Marsha filed a petition to adopt minor Gianna T., alleging Father was unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Illinois Adoption Act for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare for over one year. The Macon County Circuit Court found Father unfit by clear and convincing evidence following a fitness hearing, then determined termination of his parental rights was in the minor's best interest. Father appealed both determinations.

The Fifth District affirmed on both issues. On unfitness, the court deferred to the circuit court's credibility findings, noting Father produced no documentary evidence of attempted contact, voluntarily abandoned family court proceedings despite receiving notice, provided no financial support since October 2022, and was incarcerated due to his own criminal conduct—holding his pregnant wife at gunpoint in a home invasion. The court emphasized that self-inflicted circumstances do not excuse a parent's failure to maintain interest, concern, or responsibility, and that any one of the three disjunctive elements is independently sufficient for an unfitness finding.

On best interest, the court found the statutory factors under Adoption Act section 15.1 strongly favored termination. The minor was thriving in Mother's care, had strong bonds with both petitioners, had not seen Father since approximately age one and a half, and the GAL recommended granting the petition after home visits. Attorneys handling private adoption or parental rights termination cases should note the court's treatment of self-inflicted incarceration, the sufficiency of a single disjunctive unfitness element, and the distinction between Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act best-interest factors.

In this small claims landlord-tenant dispute, plaintiff Wieslawa Elmesquine sued her landlord Dorota Bebenek for $10,000, alleging Bebenek unlawfully entered her apartment, discarded her personal belongings, and blocked parking spots. Following a bench trial on April 28, 2025, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered judgment for Elmesquine in the amount of $2,200 plus costs, and also ruled in Elmesquine's favor on Bebenek's counterclaim, which alleged reputational harm and emotional distress arising from an allegedly false police misconduct complaint. Bebenek appealed pro se, arguing the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court never ruled on her counterclaim.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed both judgments. The dispositive issue was Bebenek's failure to include any report of proceedings or acceptable substitute under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) or (d) in the record on appeal. Without a transcript or bystander's report, the court could not review the testimony, evidence, or arguments presented at trial. Exhibits attached to Bebenek's brief but absent from the record were likewise disregarded. The court also rejected Bebenek's claim that no ruling was issued on her counterclaim, noting the Trial Call Order expressly reflected a judgment against her after trial.

This decision reinforces the well-established Foutch principle that an appellant bears the burden of presenting a complete record, and any gap in that record is resolved against the appellant. Attorneys advising clients on appeal — particularly pro se litigants — should ensure trial transcripts or acceptable substitutes are obtained and filed before pursuing appellate review of factual findings.

Mary Lou Thomas died in April 2016, leaving a three-flat Chicago property as part of her estate. After defendant Jessica Jackson, the successor executor named in the will, repeatedly violated probate court orders, the probate court found her disqualified and appointed the Cook County Public Administrator as independent administrator on December 20, 2022. Defendant did not appeal that order. The Administrator obtained authorization to pursue eviction proceedings against defendant and her daughter, who occupied one unit of the property. The eviction court entered an order of possession in favor of the Administrator on June 9, 2025, and denied defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant appealed, arguing the probate appointment order was void and subject to collateral attack in the eviction proceedings, and that the eviction court abused its discretion in denying her motion to compel discovery.

The appellate court affirmed on both issues. On the void/voidable distinction, the court held that because the probate court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the estate proceedings, any error in the appointment order rendered it merely voidable — not void. A voidable order must be challenged by timely direct appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), which defendant failed to pursue. Her attempt to collaterally attack the appointment order in the eviction proceedings was therefore improper. The court further noted that the eviction court, as a court of limited jurisdiction conducting summary proceedings focused solely on the right of possession, lacked authority to overturn a sister court's probate order. On discovery, the court held that the Administrator's expenditures and invoices were irrelevant to the sole question before the eviction court — superior right of possession — and denial of the motion to compel was not an abuse of discretion.

This decision is significant for probate and eviction practitioners because it reinforces that jurisdictional errors must be distinguished from mere legal errors, and that parties who fail to timely appeal probate court orders cannot relitigate those orders in collateral proceedings. Eviction courts will not entertain challenges to the propriety of an administrator's appointment, and discovery in eviction proceedings is strictly limited to matters germane to the right of possession.

Dr. Demetrios Giokaris's medical license was indefinitely suspended in December 2024 for allegedly failing to report an adverse action and an investigation as required by a prior consent order. He timely petitioned to contest the suspension and, under Section L of the consent order, was entitled to a merits hearing within 30 days. An ALJ had originally scheduled that hearing for January 23, 2025, but struck it to accommodate a subpoena dispute. When Giokaris moved to reschedule, the Department objected for the first time on January 27 — arguing no hearing was needed because he had admitted the underlying facts. The following day, one day before the 30-day deadline, the ALJ denied the motion and ruled on the merits without oral argument. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the First District reversed and remanded.

The appellate court held that due process and fundamental fairness required a full and meaningful opportunity for Giokaris to present his case before his medical license remained suspended. The court found the sequence of events — in which all parties anticipated a hearing until the Department's eleventh-hour objection and the ALJ ruled within 24 hours — fundamentally unfair and 'something we cannot countenance.' The court expressly declined to reach the substantive questions of whether the Medicaid reinstatement denial constituted an 'adverse action' or whether the MQRC review constituted an 'investigation' under the consent order.

This decision is significant for practitioners representing licensed professionals in summary suspension proceedings, as it signals that courts will scrutinize procedural shortcuts that deprive licensees of a meaningful hearing, and calls for more robust procedural safeguards in such high-stakes administrative proceedings.

Plaintiffs Dearl Hawkins, Michelle Hawkins, and Coleton Downes filed suit in Marion County against neighboring defendants and law enforcement officials, asserting claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and invasion of privacy arising from an ongoing neighbor dispute. The circuit court granted summary judgment on four counts, and plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment on all four counts.

On Count I, the court held that a sheriff's letter threatening future enforcement of a sex offender residency restriction did not constitute actual restraint sufficient to support false imprisonment, as Dearl remained able to be at his home during the day and eventually resumed full-time residence without consequence. On Count III, probable cause existed to arrest Coleton for criminal trespass based on surveillance video, a signed complainant statement, and the Hawkinses' own admissions — the relevant inquiry being facts known to police at the time of arrest, not Coleton's subjective awareness of posted signs. On Count IV, the court found probable cause for Dearl's prosecution as a sex offender present in a school zone because statutory permission required authorization from the superintendent or school board, not merely the principal. On Count VI, the invasion of privacy claim failed because the areas captured by the Coffmans' cameras — driveways and exterior property not enclosed or removed from public view — were not private matters.

This decision is significant for civil litigators handling false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intrusion upon seclusion claims, particularly regarding the boundaries of probable cause and the narrow scope of privacy protections for exterior residential areas.

Following a $7.7 million judgment against defendant David Zazove, plaintiff Raymond Cahnman initiated supplemental proceedings under 735 ILCS 5/2-1402 to collect the debt. During those proceedings, the parties exchanged emails in December 2023 that defendant characterized as a binding settlement for $150,000. When the parties failed to finalize a written agreement and defendant missed the payment deadline, he moved the circuit court to enforce the settlement. The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. The appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the denial of the motion to enforce the settlement constituted a final, appealable order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4), which permits appeal from final judgments or orders entered in supplemental proceedings. The court held it did not. An order is final in the supplemental proceeding context only when it puts the judgment creditor in a position to collect, forecloses collection, or definitively adjudicates rights in a specific asset. The denial here did none of those things—the supplemental proceeding continued, no asset rights were adjudicated, and the settlement dispute was merely ancillary to the enforcement action.

The court also rejected defendant's argument that the Illinois Constitution independently conferred appellate jurisdiction, reaffirming that jurisdiction is strictly defined by Supreme Court rules and that the appellant bears the burden of establishing it. Attorneys handling post-judgment enforcement matters should carefully assess whether any interlocutory order in supplemental proceedings meets the finality standard before filing a notice of appeal.

Kenneth Mannie, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Edge Brook Medical Clinic and Genesis FS Card Services alleging fraud and identity theft after being charged $3,500 for elective treatments he claimed were never rendered and suffering credit damage from a reported delinquent balance. After two prior dismissals with leave to amend, the circuit court dismissed his second amended complaint (SAC) with prejudice, finding it failed to state any cognizable claim. Mannie appealed, arguing the dismissal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion and that his SAC adequately pleaded fraud and identity theft.

The First District Appellate Court affirmed on all grounds. On the fraud claim, the court applied de novo review and held that Mannie's allegations were conclusory and failed to plead the required element that Edge Brook knowingly made a false statement of material fact. On the identity theft claim, the court held that 720 ILCS 5/16-30 is a criminal statute enforceable only by the State's Attorney or Attorney General, leaving no private civil cause of action available to Mannie. As to the dismissal with prejudice, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and, noting the absence of any hearing transcript in the record, invoked Foutch v. O'Bryant to presume the circuit court acted properly.

This decision is a practical reminder that incomplete appellate records are fatal to abuse-of-discretion challenges, that fraud claims require specific, particularized pleading of each element, and that criminal statutes do not automatically create civil remedies.

In this post-dissolution appeal, Alan Buchman challenged seven orders entered by the Cook County Domestic Relations Division arising from disputes over child support, activity payments, education expenses, and attorney fees following a December 2022 order. The appellate court consolidated four separate notices of appeal. The central disputes involved whether Buchman's deliberate refusal to pay a court-ordered instanter amount constituted contempt, whether multiple attorney fee awards were proper under section 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, whether a high school parking space qualified as an education-related expense, and whether the circuit court was required to enforce a parenting coordinator's reimbursement recommendation.

The court affirmed all orders within its jurisdiction and dismissed the interim attorney fee appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that interim fee awards under section 508(a) are not final or appealable orders. On contempt, the court found that Buchman's own testimony established willful noncompliance — he consciously withheld payment because he disagreed with the court's calculations, constituting classic self-help. Section 508(b) attorney fees were deemed mandatory following the contempt finding, and immediate purge did not excuse the obligation. The court also held that a school-provided parking space listed in the school handbook was a cognizable education-related expense, and that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 909 is merely an enabling rule that does not require courts to enforce parenting coordinator recommendations.

For practicing attorneys, this decision reinforces that clients must comply with court orders even when they believe the orders are erroneous, that section 508(b) fee awards are non-discretionary upon contempt, and that motions relitigating previously resolved provisions risk sanctions for harassment and needlessly increasing litigation costs.

In 2019, Jose Aguirre was involved in an automobile accident that totaled his vehicle and hospitalized passenger Luis Mercado. Despite a policy condition precedent requiring written notice to American Alliance Casualty Company within 30 days, Aguirre waited over two years to notify the insurer. American Alliance filed a declaratory judgment action in Cook County, and the circuit court granted summary judgment in its favor, finding that the late notice precluded coverage. Mercado appealed.

The First District affirmed on all three issues. First, the court held that even a specific 30-day notice provision carries an inherent reasonableness standard, and the five-factor Livorsi framework applies to determine whether late notice constitutes a material breach. The court reasoned that strict enforcement of such provisions would unfairly deny coverage to insureds who provide late but reasonable notice, particularly given the adhesion-contract nature of personal auto policies. Second, applying all five Livorsi factors to the undisputed facts — including Aguirre's prior accident experience, his awareness of the triggering event, and his failure to take any diligent steps to confirm coverage — the court found his two-year delay unreasonable as a matter of law. Third, the court held that once notice is found patently unreasonable, no showing of prejudice to the insurer is required.

This decision is significant for coverage counsel because it clarifies that Illinois's reasonableness standard applies to fixed-day notice provisions, not just open-ended ones, while confirming that egregiously late notice forfeits coverage without a prejudice showing.

Nancy Becker-Othman was injured in a car accident and sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from State Farm. State Farm paid the full $75,000 policy limits approximately three years after the accident, before arbitration. Becker-Othman sued in Cook County Circuit Court alleging breach of contract, bad faith delay under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code, and an implied private right of action under title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code. The trial court dismissed Count III, granted summary judgment for State Farm on Counts I and II, denied additional discovery, and required Becker-Othman to pay her expert's deposition fee. The First District affirmed all rulings.

On the breach of contract claim, the court held that the policy imposed no timing requirement for payment, and neither the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing nor the reasonable expectations doctrine supplied one — the implied covenant is a rule of construction only, and the reasonable expectations doctrine applies solely where policy language is ambiguous. The section 155 claim failed because it presupposes a successful action on the policy, and State Farm's voluntary pre-arbitration payment did not constitute such success. Count III was dismissed because title 50 administrative code violations and section 154.6 of the Insurance Code create no private right of action, with enforcement vested exclusively in the Director of Insurance.

This decision is significant for insurance coverage attorneys because it clarifies that an insurer's voluntary payment of a UIM claim — even after years of delay — cannot anchor a section 155 bad faith claim absent a successful breach of contract action, and that administrative insurance regulations remain exclusively enforceable by the Department of Insurance.

In this consolidated appeal from Macon County, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights over three minor children — Ryland S., Kyzer S., and Raylee P. The circuit court found Mother unfit on two grounds: failure to maintain reasonable interest, concern, or responsibility, and failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during applicable nine-month periods under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act. The court then found termination to be in the children's best interests at a December 2025 hearing.

On appeal, the court applied the manifest weight of the evidence standard and affirmed the unfitness finding solely on the reasonable progress ground, declining to address the second ground since only one properly proven ground is required. The record showed that Mother attended only 2 of 43 field drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine and MDMA multiple times, gave birth to Ryland while both she and the infant tested positive for methamphetamine, was discharged from substance abuse and mental health services for nonengagement, and by her own admission failed to complete two-thirds of her service plan. The court also affirmed the best interest determination, noting all three children were thriving in stable placements, bonded to caregivers committed to adoption, and that the statutory best interest factors weighed heavily in favor of termination.

For practitioners, this case reinforces that persistent, documented service plan noncompliance — particularly repeated drug test failures and substance abuse treatment disengagement — will sustain an unfitness finding, and that children's strong bonds with stable, pre-adoptive caregivers will anchor a best interest determination favoring termination.

In 2007, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services entered default administrative paternity and child support orders against DeShawn Tucker after he failed to appear for a scheduled interview. Tucker claimed he never received notice because service was made at an address where he no longer resided. In 2015, the Department modified his support obligation to $0 due to incarceration. In May 2023 — sixteen years after the original orders — Tucker filed an administrative appeal arguing the 2007 orders were void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective substitute service. The Department dismissed the appeal as untimely under the two-year statutory limitations period, and the Circuit Court of Cook County affirmed. Tucker appealed to the First District.

The appellate court affirmed on all issues. First, the Department's factual finding that Tucker resided at the served address in January 2007 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as his former girlfriend's testimony directly supported that finding. Second, and more significantly, the court held that the Department — as an administrative agency possessing only legislatively conferred authority — lacked jurisdiction to vacate its own orders outside the two-year limitations period under section 10-14.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, even if those orders were allegedly void. Unlike courts, administrative agencies do not possess inherent equitable power to vacate void orders at any time.

Presiding Justice Martin concurred specially, emphasizing that Tucker's potential due process remedy lay in seeking a declaratory judgment in circuit court — a path not barred by exhaustion doctrine when the agency is powerless to act — but Tucker failed to plead declaratory relief, filing only a complaint for administrative review. Attorneys should note that challenges to allegedly void administrative orders must be pursued through circuit court declaratory actions, not untimely administrative appeals.

The parties divorced in Cook County in 2020 with three children. All parties subsequently relocated—respondent and the children to Michigan, petitioner to Georgia. In 2024, respondent filed a motion to modify child support in Cook County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found a substantial change of circumstances, modified petitioner's support obligation upward, and ordered payment of arrearages and unreimbursed expenses. Petitioner, appearing pro se, appealed, raising challenges to Illinois jurisdiction under UIFSA, the court's modification of the dissolution judgment's true-up and receipts provisions, and the adequacy of the court's written findings supporting the modified support amount.

The appellate court affirmed on all issues. On jurisdiction, the court held that UIFSA section 205 does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, which is constitutionally conferred. Although personal jurisdiction under UIFSA requires consent when all parties reside outside Illinois, petitioner waived any objection by filing an appearance, answer, and affirmative defenses and fully participating in proceedings without raising a timely challenge under 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-6). His conduct also independently constituted affirmative consent.

On the merits, the court's analysis was largely controlled by petitioner's failure to include a report of proceedings in the appellate record. Under Foutch v. O'Bryant, the appellate court presumed the circuit court's factual findings—including that respondent submitted required receipts and that a substantial change of circumstances existed—were supported by the evidence. The court also confirmed that a substantial change in circumstances may rest solely on an increase in the supporting parent's income, and that no additional written findings are required when the court applies guideline support without deviation.

Plaintiffs Valentina Fornadel and Maria Groszew, nieces of the deceased Jewdokia Sawczenko, challenged a September 3, 2021 amendment to a land trust beneficiary designation that replaced them with defendant Rosa Kelly, Mrs. Sawczenko's daughter, shortly before Mrs. Sawczenko's death. After multiple failed pleading attempts, the Cook County Circuit Court dismissed plaintiffs' second-amended complaint with prejudice under section 2-615 and denied leave to file a third-amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed both rulings, along with a discovery stay order.

The First District affirmed on all issues. On the core undue influence question, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations — including a strained pre-February 2021 relationship and a witness's observations of Mrs. Sawczenko's incapacity on September 11–12, 2021 — failed to address her condition or defendant's conduct on September 3, 2021, the date the amendment was actually signed. The court also rejected plaintiffs' reliance on the debilitated-testator presumption from Swenson v. Wintercorn, reaffirming that the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Estate of Coffman expressly declined to recognize that presumption. The court further held that defendant merely driving Mrs. Sawczenko to the bank and asking her to sign the document was insufficient to allege that defendant overcame the decedent's free will.

For practitioners, this case underscores that undue influence pleadings must be grounded in specific facts directly connected to the moment of execution. Broad discovery requests and circumstantial allegations about general family dynamics or post-execution incapacity will not substitute for particularized factual allegations. The court also applied the Loyola factors strictly, affirming denial of a fourth amendment attempt after more than three years at the pleading stage.

Marwan Fateen claimed to have occupied a Chicago property since 2018 and paid property taxes from 2017–2022, but held no recorded ownership interest and disclaimed any ownership in his own filings. The Cook County Land Bank Authority (CCLBA) purchased the property at a 2019 Scavenger Tax Sale based on delinquent taxes for 2007–2016, and a tax deed was issued in September 2022 and recorded in 2023. Fateen filed two successive section 2-1401 petitions seeking to vacate the tax deed, alleging fraud, deception, and failure to provide required statutory notices. The circuit court dismissed both petitions, and Fateen appealed.

The First District Appellate Court affirmed on the threshold issue of standing, holding that a petitioner must hold a bona fide title or interest in the property — sufficient to confer the right to redeem — to collaterally attack a tax deed via section 2-1401. Because Fateen expressly disclaimed ownership and held only informal occupancy based on undocumented consent from the prior owner's heirs, he lacked the requisite interest. The court also noted that section 22-45(4) relief is expressly limited to parties holding a recorded ownership or other recorded interest, which Fateen did not possess. The court declined to reach the fraud, deception, or due diligence issues.

Practically, this decision reinforces that paying taxes or occupying property — without a formal, documented legal interest — is insufficient to confer standing to challenge a tax deed in Illinois, even where a party may have been entitled to notice under section 22-10.

Corinthian Condominium Association filed a forcible entry and detainer action against unit owner Padma Rao seeking possession and $3,066.65 in unpaid assessments. Rao moved for summary judgment, arguing the 30-day notice was fatally defective because it overstated the amount owed. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Corinthian was awarded possession and $2,223.69 in assessments — less than the noticed amount — and the court subsequently awarded $30,853 in attorneys' fees. Rao appealed the denial of summary judgment, the denial of her post-trial motions for JNOV or a new trial, the jury instructions, and the fee award.

The First District affirmed on all issues. On the notice question, the court held that an inaccurately stated amount does not automatically invalidate a 30-day notice under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, relying on Burnham Management Co. v. Davis and Elizondo v. Medina. Because Rao tendered no money in response to the notice, she could not establish prejudice from the overstatement. The court also upheld the jury instructions, reasoning that a plaintiff may only recover amounts proved at trial — as the verdict itself demonstrated — and that neither the Act nor caselaw requires invalidation of a notice for misstating the amount owed.

On attorneys' fees, the court rejected each of Rao's specific challenges, finding that the amended fee petition properly superseded the original, that arguments lacking supporting authority were forfeited, and that Rao's allegations of false filings were unsupported by the record. This decision provides important guidance for condominium associations and their counsel on the sufficiency of pre-suit notices and the recoverability of attorneys' fees in assessment collection litigation.

This is the fourth appeal arising from a construction dispute between general contractor Pepper Construction Co. and subcontractor Bourbon Marble, Inc. stemming from a 2004–2007 condominium build-out in Chicago. Following three prior appeals and a fee award totaling over $3.7 million, Pepper wired $4,283,621.04 to Bourbon on April 2, 2024, calculating post-judgment interest from July 28, 2022—the date the trial court entered its fee award on remand. Bourbon disputed the calculation, arguing interest should have run from May 12, 2020, the date of the original fee award that was later remanded, and served citations to discover assets. Bourbon also filed a third petition for attorney fees seeking $236,946.87 for work performed after the July 28, 2022 award. The trial court quashed the citations and denied the fee petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Bourbon appealed.

The appellate court affirmed on both issues. On the interest question, the court held that post-judgment interest under 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 begins running only when the amount owed is 'certain' and the debtor has had improper use of the money. Because the prior remand left the entire question of prevailing party status—and thus whether any fees were owed at all—unresolved, the judgment was not certain until July 28, 2022. The court distinguished cases where remand involved only a ministerial recalculation or a reduction in a liability already established. On the fee petition, the court held that satisfaction of the judgment terminated the supplementary proceeding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f), and that the law-of-the-case doctrine, based on the Pepper III court's express statement that 'at some point the escalating fees must come to an end,' precluded further fee proceedings that Bourbon failed to challenge through rehearing or a petition for leave to appeal.

This decision is significant for attorneys litigating fee-shifting disputes and post-judgment collection matters. It clarifies that when a remand leaves liability—not merely the amount—unresolved, post-judgment interest does not relate back to the original judgment date. It also underscores that supplementary proceedings end upon satisfaction of judgment and that appellate pronouncements limiting further proceedings carry binding law-of-the-case effect in subsequent appeals.

Scott Bogot and Nancy Dougan, condominium owners in a Glenview planned development, filed a class action against the Haverford Homeowners Association and its board members challenging the enforceability of assessments and the association's organizational structure. After a series of dismissals in the Circuit Court of Cook County, plaintiffs appealed four rulings: dismissal of their claims that assessments were unlawful (covenant does not run with the land), that assessments were unconscionable, that board members breached fiduciary duties, and that the association's structure violated the Common Interest Community Association Act (CICAA).

The First District affirmed all four rulings. On the covenant question, the court held that the touch-and-concern requirement is satisfied when a covenant affects the use, value, and enjoyment of the land — the relevant inquiry is the covenant's relationship to the land, not whether owners actually exercise their right to use common areas. On unconscionability, the court found that an equal-per-unit assessment formula is not substantively unconscionable where all owners share equal rights to use the community area, and plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient procedural unconscionability. On standing, the court held that misappropriation of association funds is an injury to the association itself, requiring a derivative action; plaintiffs' alleged harm as individual owners was merely indirect. On the CICAA claim, the court held that defendants qualify as a master association under the plain language of the Condominium Property Act and are therefore governed by that Act, not the CICAA — and the declaration's own contrary characterization cannot override the statute.

This decision provides important guidance for HOA and real estate attorneys on the enforceability of assessment covenants, the limits of unconscionability challenges to declaration terms, the derivative-versus-direct action distinction in association disputes, and the interplay between the Condominium Property Act and the CICAA in mixed planned developments.

Carl Arcangel filed a putative class action in Cook County against Yardi Systems, Inc., alleging that Yardi's 3.5% credit card surcharge on rent payments made through its RentCafe platform violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted unjust enrichment, because the fee allegedly exceeded the 3% cap permitted under Visa's merchant rules. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under section 2-615, finding the disclosed fee and the availability of a fee-free payment alternative defeated plaintiff's claims. The First District affirmed.

The appellate court held that both the deception and unfairness prongs of plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act claim impermissibly reduced to a breach of contract theory — specifically, Yardi's alleged violation of the Visa Rules — without any independent basis for consumer harm. The court extended the established principle that a bare breach of contract is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act to third-party contracts, reasoning that plaintiff, at most an incidental beneficiary of the Visa Rules, could not derive a statutory consumer fraud claim solely from their breach. On deception, the court found no duty for merchants to disclose third-party contract terms, and no affirmative misrepresentation in Yardi's fee disclosure. On unfairness, the availability of a fee-free bank account autopay option defeated any oppressiveness argument. The unjust enrichment claim failed derivatively.

This decision is significant for class action defense counsel and consumer protection practitioners: it forecloses using alleged violations of payment network rules as a standalone predicate for Consumer Fraud Act liability and reinforces that disclosed fees paired with meaningful free alternatives will generally defeat both deception and unfairness claims.

This opinion from Rule 23 was filed on 2026-05-22. The case "In re Marriage of Marie, 2026 IL App (4th) 250184" (Docket: 2026 IL App (4th) 250184) addresses important legal issues. Due to technical difficulties, the full AI summary is temporarily unavailable. Please review the full opinion for complete details.