Vasquez v. Aguilar
Rule 23 Civil Family Law
Holdings
- Trial courts must make express findings under section 214(c)(3) of the IDVA before entering a plenary order of protection, or it will be reversed.
- A respondent may forgo immediate interlocutory appeal of an OP and instead appeal within 30 days of denial of a timely post-judgment motion.
- Useful for family law and domestic relations attorneys litigating orders of protection, appellate jurisdiction/timing issues, and mootness in expired-OP appeals.
Summary
In this domestic relations appeal, Aida Vasquez obtained a three-month plenary order of protection against Robinson Aguilar under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act based on a finding of past abuse arising from a lockout dispute over a shared condo, along with a monetary award for her moving and hotel expenses. Robinson's motion to reconsider was denied, and he timely appealed from that denial rather than pursuing an immediate interlocutory appeal.
The appellate court first addressed threshold issues, holding that Robinson's appeal was timely under Rule 304(a)(1) because a respondent may elect to wait and appeal after denial of a post-judgment motion rather than immediately appeal an injunctive order under Rule 307(a)(1). The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to consider any claims of error raised by Aida, who had not filed her own notice of appeal or cross-appeal. Although the order of protection had expired, the court found the appeal not moot because reversal could still afford meaningful relief given the OP's effect on Robinson's firearm rights and law enforcement employment, and because the separate monetary judgment remained subject to reversal.
On the merits, the court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to make the mandatory forward-looking findings required by section 214(c)(3)(ii) and (iii)—namely, that Robinson's conduct, unless prohibited, would likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse, and that the relief was necessary to protect Aida. The trial court had instead expressly rejected Aida's claims of ongoing risk as implausible. This omission required reversal of both the order of protection and the associated monetary judgment, though Aida may pursue a separate civil action for damages.
In short
A respondent to an order of protection may timely appeal within 30 days of denial of a post-judgment motion rather than immediately appealing under Rule 307(a)(1).
An appellee who does not file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal cannot obtain appellate review of her own claims of error; her brief may only be considered as a response to the appellant's arguments.
An appeal challenging an expired order of protection is not moot where reversal would provide meaningful relief, such as restoring firearm rights or reversing an associated monetary judgment.
A trial court must make express findings under section 214(c)(3) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act—including that the respondent's conduct would likely cause irreparable harm or continued abuse and that the relief is necessary—before entering a plenary order of protection; failure to do so is reversible error.
This summary was drafted by AI and verified against the slip opinion. It may contain errors and is not legal advice — always read the original before relying on it.