Alice D., a minor, was taken into DCFS custody in February 2023. After DNA testing excluded the named putative father, the State served 'any and all unknown fathers' by publication and obtained a default order terminating their parental rights in November 2024. Michael J., who later confirmed paternity through DNA testing, filed a section 2-1401 motion to vacate, alleging he had been deceived by the mother into believing another man was the biological father. The circuit court denied the motion, finding a diligent inquiry had been conducted and that Father failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence. Father appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the State's inquiry—limited solely to asking the mother to identify possible fathers—fell far short of the diligent inquiry required by section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act before resorting to service by publication. Relying on In re C.K. and DCFS Administrative Procedure No. 22, the court found the State was also required to review agency and court files and to question available relatives, including the maternal grandparents who served as foster parents and had ongoing DCFS contact. Because the State failed to conduct a diligent inquiry, the circuit court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Father, rendering the default termination order void ab initio.

The court further held that because the order was void, Father was not required to demonstrate a meritorious defense or due diligence under section 2-1401—the allegation of voidness substitutes for those requirements. This decision is significant for practitioners navigating termination proceedings involving unknown or unlocated fathers, as it establishes that publication service requires meaningful investigative steps beyond a single inquiry to the mother.

Madhavi Ryali and Sunit Singla are divorced parents of two minor children governed by a 2018 Allocation Judgment. Following Madhavi's petitions to modify parenting arrangements and Sunit's petition for rule to show cause, the Du Page County circuit court held a five-day trial and issued a December 2024 ruling granting Madhavi sole decision-making authority, suspending Sunit's parenting time indefinitely, permitting enrollment of the younger child in private school, and denying Sunit's contempt petition. Sunit appealed all rulings to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issues on appeal were whether the modifications were against the manifest weight of the evidence, whether the trial court erred in denying Sunit's contempt petition, and whether various recordings were improperly admitted or considered. The appellate court affirmed on all issues. Under Section 603.10(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the court found sufficient evidence of serious endangerment, including Sunit swearing at and physically intimidating the children, causing one child to urinate on herself and the other to threaten self-harm. The GAL, therapists, custody evaluator, and reunification counselor all recommended restrictions. On contempt, the court held Madhavi's noncompliance was not willful because professionals advised her not to force the children to attend parenting time.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that credibility determinations and professional recommendations carry substantial weight in parenting time modification proceedings, and that a custodial parent may defeat a contempt finding by demonstrating reliance on therapist and GAL guidance. The court also clarified that evidentiary errors involving recordings are subject to harmless error analysis where the trial court expressly declined to rely on the disputed evidence.

Emma Nyssen filed a petition for a stalking no contact order against Shahryar Zarrinmehr in the Circuit Court of Cook County. After an emergency order was entered and extended multiple times, the trial court entered a plenary stalking no contact order on November 5, 2025, prohibiting Zarrinmehr from contacting Nyssen, approaching her residence or workplace within 100 feet, and possessing a FOID card or firearms. Zarrinmehr appealed pro se, challenging the trial court's factual findings underlying the plenary order.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed on two independent grounds. First, Zarrinmehr's brief failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h): his statement of facts contained argument rather than a fair recitation of the record, and he cited no legal authorities whatsoever. The court emphasized that supreme court rules are not mere suggestions and that pro se status confers no procedural leniency. Second, and dispositive, Zarrinmehr failed to include a report of proceedings from the November 5, 2025 hearing, and provided no acceptable substitute such as a bystander's report or agreed statement of facts under Rule 323. Applying Foutch v. O'Bryant, the court presumed the trial court's order conformed with law and had a sufficient factual basis.

This case is a practical reminder that appellate success depends on record preservation and strict compliance with briefing rules. Attorneys representing clients in protection order proceedings should ensure a complete transcript is ordered and that appellate briefs fully comply with Rule 341(h) requirements.

In In re A.E., the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for minors A.E. and C.D. in Cook County, alleging neglect based on an injurious environment and abuse based on a substantial risk of physical injury following a June 2024 incident in which respondent-mother S.E. allegedly choked A.E. The juvenile court found the minors abused and neglected, adjudged them wards of the court, and denied respondent's motions to compel the minors to testify or be deposed. Respondent appealed both the adjudicatory findings and the denial of her motion to compel testimony.

On the sufficiency of evidence, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the minors' out-of-court statements were admissible under section 2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act and mutually corroborated each other — both reported respondent choked A.E., and bruising was observed on A.E.'s upper lip. The court rejected respondent's argument that physical evidence of choking was required, finding the abuse statute demands only a substantial risk of physical injury. Respondent's extensive DCFS history — 25 investigations, all 11 children removed, and prior abuse findings involving these same minors — was properly considered under section 2-18(3).

On the motion to compel testimony, the court affirmed the trial court's denial, emphasizing that the Juvenile Court Act prioritizes children's best interests over parental litigation interests. Given both minors' documented histories of suicidal ideation, trauma, and emotional dysregulation, their unwillingness to testify, and the availability of their prior statements, compelling testimony would have caused undue harm. Practitioners should note that prior DCFS history and corroborating out-of-court statements can independently sustain abuse and neglect findings, and that courts retain broad discretion to shield traumatized minors from compelled testimony.

This consolidated appeal arose from a Cook County probate guardianship proceeding involving Nora Kornesczuk, an aging woman whose children disagreed about her placement in a residential care facility. After the trial court ordered placement and that ruling was affirmed on appeal, the guardian ad litem (GAL) filed two separate fee petitions. In both instances, the trial court allocated a disproportionate share of the GAL's fees to respondent-appellant James Kornesczuk (Jim), finding that his objections and continued litigation were the sole cause of the GAL's reappointment and the resulting fees. Jim appealed both allocation orders, arguing abuse of discretion, impermissible sanctioning, arbitrariness, and denial of evidentiary hearings.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed both orders. The court held that Section 11a-10 of the Probate Act vests trial courts with broad discretion to allocate GAL fees, and that which party caused the need for those fees is a recognized and proper consideration. Because Jim's actions alone prompted the GAL's reappointment, allocating a greater share of fees to him was not an abuse of discretion and did not constitute a sanction. The court also rejected Jim's evidentiary hearing arguments, noting that in both proceedings the trial court expressly offered him the opportunity to present evidence or submit written objections, and his counsel declined each time.

For probate and guardianship practitioners, this decision confirms that Illinois courts may look beyond equal division when allocating GAL fees, particularly where one party's litigation conduct is the primary driver of those costs. Attorneys should advise clients that prolonged, unsuccessful opposition in guardianship proceedings can result in disproportionate fee liability, and that declining an offered evidentiary hearing forfeits that argument on appeal.

Regina and Darryl Thomas divorced after a lengthy marriage. Following a bench trial in Cook County, the circuit court divided Regina's CTA pension and the equity in her Matteson home equally between the parties, denied maintenance, and ordered mediation on visitation. Regina appealed, challenging the property allocation. Darryl did not file a response brief, and the appellate court resolved the case on Regina's brief alone. Before reaching the merits, the court confirmed its jurisdiction, holding that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272, the 30-day appeal period triggered by the filing of the signed judgment order with the circuit court clerk—not the date the judge signed it. Because the order was clerk-filed on November 6, 2024, and Regina noticed her appeal on December 6, 2024, the appeal was timely.

On the merits, the court applied the Section 503(d) factors of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. It affirmed the trial court's finding that both parties contributed to the marital estate—Darryl's non-financial contributions enabling Regina to work full-time and earn her pension—but found an abuse of discretion in the equal split. The trial court failed to adequately account for the fact that Regina is the sole caregiver and financial provider for Junior, their disabled adult son who cannot live independently, while Darryl bears none of that burden. Invoking Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), the appellate court modified the judgment directly, awarding Regina two-thirds and Darryl one-third of both the pension and home equity. The court declined to order a separate trust for Junior, treating the adjusted property division as the appropriate remedy.

This decision is significant for family law practitioners because it confirms that a disabled adult child's ongoing care needs are a cognizable factor in marital property division under Section 503(d), and that appellate courts may modify—rather than merely remand—inequitable property allocations when the record is sufficient.

Plaintiff Qusai Alkafaween filed a civil tort action against the Village of New Lenox and two of its police officers after he was struck by a car following a late-night drop-off in an unfamiliar area. Officers had responded to a trespass complaint at Silver Cross Hospital and, rather than arresting plaintiff, transported him to a location near the county line. The trial court granted summary judgment for the New Lenox defendants, finding the officers had transitioned to a community caretaking function triggering absolute immunity under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District.

The central issue was whether the officers were providing police protection services under section 4-102 (absolute immunity) or executing and enforcing the law under section 2-202 (limited immunity, with a willful and wanton conduct exception). The appellate court reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to which provision applied. The court identified competing evidence on both sides: facts suggesting community caretaking (no arrest, calm tone, assurances of assistance) and facts suggesting law enforcement activity (dispatched on a trespass complaint, physically blocking re-entry, transporting plaintiff to a location of the officers' choosing, and an officer describing the act as 'dumping' plaintiff near the county line). The court also declined to apply general discretionary immunity under section 2-201, finding sections 4-102 and 2-202 more specifically addressed the conduct at issue.

For practitioners, this decision underscores that the characterization of police conduct as community caretaking versus law enforcement is ordinarily a question of fact not resolvable on summary judgment when the record supports competing inferences. Attorneys litigating municipal immunity cases should carefully develop the factual record regarding the nature and purpose of officer conduct at each stage of an encounter.

Following the 2019 dissolution of the Moros' marriage, Monika Moro filed multiple post-dissolution motions and petitions seeking back pay of calculated child support and maintenance, contempt findings, and enforcement of a college expense order. The Du Page County circuit court dismissed all of Monika's filings, concluding that prior orders from June 12, 2024, and July 23, 2024 — which set a $24,000 contempt purge amount and subsequently found that purge satisfied — were dispositive under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(4) and barred further litigation of past due support amounts. Monika appealed.

The Third District reversed, finding that the prior orders did not constitute final rulings on the total past due child support and maintenance amounts. The record showed the June 12, 2024, order directed Monika to calculate the exact amount owed and reserved a future ruling, and the case was transferred to a new courtroom before that determination was ever made. Because no final ruling on the past due amounts existed, the prior orders could not serve as a bar under section 2-619(4). The court also found the college expense petition could not logically be barred by orders that never addressed college expenses. However, the court forfeited additional arguments in Monika's brief that were presented without cohesive legal authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7).

For family law practitioners, this decision clarifies that a satisfied contempt purge order does not automatically resolve the underlying question of total arrears, and courts must make an express final ruling on past due amounts before those issues are foreclosed.

Cleother Tidwell, a pro se inmate at Menard Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Randolph County circuit court against two correctional officers, alleging they physically attacked him while he was handcuffed on April 27, 2021. Only defendant Brandon Edwards was served. Edwards moved to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, asserting failure to state a claim (§ 2-615), failure to exhaust administrative remedies (§ 2-619(a)(9)), and sovereign immunity (§ 2-619(a)(1)). The circuit court granted the motion with prejudice, and later denied Tidwell's motion for reconsideration. Tidwell appealed both rulings.

The Fifth District affirmed on all grounds. On the § 2-615 issue, the court held that Tidwell's complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to identify any deprivation of a property or liberty interest — an essential element of a § 1983 claim — and offered only conclusory allegations. On the § 2-619(a)(9) issue, the court held that Tidwell failed to demonstrate administrative finality because, while he appealed an untimely August 2021 grievance (which was rejected as untimely), he never claimed to have appealed his timely April 27, 2021 grievance to the Administrative Review Board, and no record evidence showed such an appeal. The court declined to reach the sovereign immunity argument as unnecessary.

For practitioners, this decision reinforces that Illinois state courts apply the same rigorous pleading and exhaustion requirements to prisoner § 1983 claims as federal courts. Attorneys advising inmate plaintiffs must ensure both that complaints specifically allege a cognizable constitutional deprivation and that all timely grievances are fully appealed through the ARB before filing suit.

Dr. Kermit Muhammad, an orthopedic and hand surgeon with clinical privileges at Riverside Healthcare, filed suit after Riverside took adverse action against his privileges when he sought a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccination policy. His third amended complaint alleged breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional interference with employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit court dismissed all counts with prejudice, finding statutory immunity under section 10.2 of the Hospital Licensing Act, mootness as to the breach of contract count, and failure to state a claim on the remaining counts. The Third District reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The appellate court reversed on immunity and mootness. Applying Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a sham peer review purpose — specifically, that defendants used the COVID-19 vaccination policy as a pretext to divert his hand surgery patients to a competing Riverside Medical Group surgeon, supported by specific volume statistics showing a 408-surgery increase for the competitor. The breach of contract count was not moot because plaintiff still sought monetary damages tied to mandatory adverse-action reporting obligations that would affect his insurance rates and practice going forward.

The court affirmed dismissal of the remaining counts. Tortious interference failed because plaintiff did not allege binding contracts with patients or referring physicians, and past relationships alone do not establish a reasonable expectancy of future business. The intentional interference with employment contract claim failed because plaintiff did not plead specific facts showing CEO Kambic acted outside his qualified privilege as a corporate officer. The intentional infliction claim failed for insufficient allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress. Attorneys litigating physician credentialing disputes should note that detailed, fact-specific allegations of competitive patient-diversion can overcome statutory peer review immunity at the pleading stage.

Jorge Luis Cortes-Yepez filed a pro se petition for a Stalking No Contact Order (SNCO) against his then-coworker Gerardo Avelar in Cook County, alleging multiple incidents of violent and harassing workplace conduct, including Avelar placing a plastic bag over petitioner's head twice while threatening to kill him, punching him, throwing a clam at his face, and subjecting him to homophobic harassment. The trial court entered an emergency SNCO, but at the plenary hearing denied a permanent order solely because the parties no longer worked together, citing 'insufficient evidence' on that basis. Petitioner appealed.

The First District Appellate Court reversed on two grounds. First, applying de novo review, the court held that section 80(a) of the Stalking No Contact Order Act — providing that a stalking no contact order 'shall issue' upon a finding that petitioner was a victim of stalking — imposes a mandatory obligation, not discretionary authority. Drawing on the plain meaning of 'shall,' the Act's stated purpose, and the analogous holding in Sanchez v. Torres under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, the court found no room for judicial discretion once stalking is established. Second, applying manifest weight review, the court found the trial court had effectively determined stalking occurred, and the parties' changed employment status was legally insufficient to override the Act's mandatory directive.

The court remanded with direction to enter a two-year plenary SNCO. Attorneys handling protective order matters should note that once a court finds stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, issuance of an SNCO is non-discretionary, and changed circumstances between the parties do not defeat that obligation.

Shade George Ghanayem, acting as attorney-in-fact for the record owner of property at 4857 West Division Street in Chicago, filed a petition in August 2024 challenging the validity of a Certificate of Purchase, alleging it had been fraudulently altered. While that petition was pending, a separate Cook County Division proceeding resulted in a sale-in-error order on September 26, 2024, which vacated the tax sale and directed a full refund to the certificate holder, Fundpality II, LLC. The circuit court dismissed Ghanayem's petition with prejudice on grounds of mootness, lack of standing, and duplicativeness, and denied leave to file an amended petition.

The First District affirmed solely on mootness grounds, declining to address standing or duplicativeness. Reviewing de novo, the court held that because the sale-in-error order nullified the Certificate and the funds were returned, any judicial declaration regarding the alleged forgery would have no practical legal effect. The court also rejected Ghanayem's argument that the alleged forgery rendered the sale-in-error order void, reasoning that a court's jurisdiction does not depend on the legal sufficiency of the underlying pleadings or documents, and thus an alleged defect in the Certificate could not strip the County Division court of authority to enter the order.

Practically, this decision confirms that once a tax sale is vacated through a sale-in-error order and funds are refunded, collateral challenges to the certificate of purchase are moot and cannot be revived through amended pleadings. Attorneys should also note that failure to provide a hearing transcript on appeal will trigger the Foutch presumption that the circuit court's order was legally sufficient.

In August 2025, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship in Rock Island County regarding five children of Tiffany R. The trial court found the eldest child, T.R., abused and neglected, and found the four younger children neglected, making all five wards of the court. Following a January 2026 dispositional hearing, the court found Tiffany unable to care for the children, approved recommended services, and set reunification as the permanency goal for the younger children, who remained placed with their father Morrio R. Tiffany appealed only the neglect findings and dispositional orders concerning the four younger children.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed both the neglect findings and the dispositional orders. As to neglect, the court held that Tiffany's severe physical assault of T.R. in the presence of the younger children — causing significant visible injuries — and her subsequent abandonment of T.R. on an interstate without shoes or a phone, provided sufficient evidence of an injurious environment. The court applied the statutory rule permitting proof of abuse or neglect of one child as evidence of neglect of siblings, and emphasized that courts need not wait for each child to suffer harm before acting. Tiffany's continued characterization of the incident as a 'mutual altercation' further evidenced a lack of accountability.

On the dispositional challenge, the court found no abuse of discretion, reasoning that requiring minimal service compliance before returning children to unfettered parental supervision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted Tiffany's failure to cite supporting authority or adequately develop her dispositional argument.

Plaintiff Kameron Huckleby filed a pro se complaint in Cook County Circuit Court against multiple defendants, including Judge William Gamboney, alleging constitutional violations, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and inhumane incarceration conditions arising from his COVID-era incarceration. On July 10, 2024, the trial court granted Judge Gamboney's amended motion to dismiss with prejudice, but the order addressed only Gamboney and did not reference the remaining defendants—Thomas Dart, Kimberly Foxx, and the Cook County Department of Corrections—nor did it include a Rule 304(a) finding. More than 30 days later, on February 4, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the case, which the trial court struck as untimely on March 5, 2025. Plaintiff appealed from that March 5 order.

The First District dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the July 10, 2024 order was not a final judgment because it disposed of the case as to only one defendant in a multi-party action without a Rule 304(a) finding, making it non-appealable until the entire action was terminated. Because plaintiff's motion to reinstate was filed more than 30 days after a non-final order, it was untimely as a postjudgment motion, and an appeal from the striking of that motion provided no jurisdictional basis. The court declined to separately dismiss for plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 341(h) briefing requirements, though it acknowledged discretion to do so.

For practicing attorneys, this decision reinforces two critical Illinois appellate practice rules: partial dismissals in multi-party cases require a Rule 304(a) finding to be immediately appealable, and postjudgment motions must be filed within 30 days of the relevant order to preserve appellate jurisdiction. Failure to obtain a Rule 304(a) finding can leave parties without a clear appellate pathway until the entire case concludes.

Five siblings inherited a Palos Hills townhome through a Transfer on Death Instrument. Four sought partition by sale under the Illinois Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (755 ILCS 75/1 et seq.); the fifth, Susan McDunn, opposed the sale. The dispute was resolved when Susan purchased her siblings' interests for $160,000. The Cook County circuit court then apportioned attorney fees and costs under section 12 of the Act, ordering Susan to bear 40% of plaintiffs' $19,110 in attorney fees while awarding her only $1,500 of the $5,256.25 she sought for her own outside counsel. Susan appealed pro se, challenging the fee apportionment, the reasonableness of plaintiffs' fees, her limited fee award, denial of credits for lost profits and a tax refund, and denial of her motion to strike disparaging language from plaintiffs' filings.

The appellate court affirmed all rulings, holding that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review under section 12's 'just and equitable' language. The court found no abuse of discretion in the 40% apportionment, noting that section 12 contains no language shielding a party from fee liability merely because she contested the action. The court further held that Susan's defenses—pointing out mislabeled parties, an uncited statute, and a scrivener's error in the property PIN—were purely technical and did not qualify as 'good and substantial defenses' under section 12, which requires defenses that actually affect the parties' interests in the property.

For practitioners, this decision clarifies that vigorous but technically-focused opposition in heirs property partition cases will not insulate a co-owner from fee apportionment, and that incomplete appellate records and Rule 341(h)(7) briefing failures will independently doom an appeal.

Irene Kogan, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County against attorney Todd McCartney alleging fraud and breach of contract, claiming she paid a $2,000 retainer for representation in a contingency case that McCartney never pursued. Following a bench trial in January 2025, the trial court awarded Kogan $750. She appealed seeking the remaining $1,250, arguing McCartney failed to produce documentation of his representation at trial.

The First District affirmed, primarily because Kogan failed to provide a transcript of the trial proceedings or any proper substitute under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323. Without a record of the evidence presented, arguments made, or the basis for the trial court's ruling, the appellate court had no basis to disturb the judgment and applied the well-established presumption from Foutch v. O'Bryant that the trial court acted in conformity with the law with a sufficient factual basis. The court also refused to consider approximately 40 pages of text messages and emails Kogan attached to her brief's appendix, reaffirming that parties may not supplement the appellate record through brief appendices.

Although Kogan's brief violated Rule 341(h) — lacking jurisdictional statements, legal authority, record citations, and a proper argument section — the court declined to dismiss on that basis alone, noting McCartney's brief was similarly deficient. The case underscores the critical importance of securing a trial transcript before filing a notice of appeal and ensuring that all evidentiary materials are properly admitted into the record below.

William Graft, Sr. and his brother Michael Graft, Jr. were co-owners of two real estate development entities that undertook the Tallgrass residential development in Barrington, Illinois. After Harris Bank filed a foreclosure action in 2009 on over $13.5 million in outstanding debt, William filed a cross-complaint alleging Michael breached fiduciary duties by concealing a loan default, entering a secret consent-foreclosure agreement with Harris Bank, and selling a lot below the agreed price. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Michael had breached his fiduciary duties but that those breaches did not proximately cause the entities' injuries. William appealed both that ruling and a 2019 Cook County order denying him leave to file a third amended complaint.

The appellate court affirmed on all three issues. On proximate cause, the court held that the trial court's finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because William's expert testimony on bridge loan availability depended entirely on an appraisal the trial court found unreliable — one that adopted 2006 peak-market valuations, used no comparable Lake County sales, ignored litigation effects, and assumed an ahistorical lot-sales rate. On jurisdiction, the court held that consolidation of the separate actions into a single suit caused each case to lose its individual identity, making the 2019 order reviewable upon final resolution in 2025. On the motion to amend, the court found William forfeited his arguments by failing to adequately brief the Loyola factors under Rule 341(h)(7).

This decision is significant for business litigators because it underscores that expert testimony in fiduciary duty cases must rest on independently reliable foundations, and that inadequate appellate briefing on multi-factor tests will result in forfeiture regardless of the underlying merits.

The Village of Palatine sued Thomas Paulick in Cook County Circuit Court on five counts seeking enforcement of an unpaid $9,855 administrative fine, property repair orders, additional fines, and injunctive relief. On May 30, 2025, the circuit court granted summary judgment in the Village's favor on all five counts. However, Paulick had filed counterclaims on April 25, 2025, alleging trespass, fabrication of evidence, and harassment, which remained pending. The summary judgment order contained no Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding. Paulick filed a notice of appeal on June 27, 2025, and the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over a summary judgment order that resolved fewer than all claims in a multi-claim case without a Rule 304(a) express written finding. The court held it did not. Under Rule 304(a), when multiple claims are pending, a final judgment as to fewer than all claims is not immediately appealable absent an express written finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. The circuit court made no such finding, and its own subsequent orders — reserving attorney fees, interest, and additional fines for later determination — confirmed the case was ongoing.

For practicing attorneys, this case is a clear reminder that in multi-claim litigation, securing a Rule 304(a) finding is a prerequisite to appealing a partial final judgment. Failing to obtain that finding — or incorrectly asserting one exists — will result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Janet Drobick sued Costco Wholesale Corporation after falling in its parking lot on February 8, 2022, allegedly due to a pavement deviation. Following discovery, Costco moved for summary judgment, arguing the one-quarter inch deviation was de minimis and triggered no common-law duty. The circuit court struck Drobick's opposition affidavit—in which she claimed her multiple sclerosis made her more susceptible to minor defects—because it directly contradicted her deposition testimony in which she unequivocally denied that her MS contributed to the fall. The court then entered summary judgment for Costco, and Drobick appealed both rulings.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on both issues. On the affidavit, the court reaffirmed that Illinois law prohibits a non-movant from contradicting sworn deposition admissions through a subsequent affidavit to avoid summary judgment. On the de minimis doctrine, the court held that a one-quarter inch pavement deviation—far below the generally recognized two-inch ceiling—does not present a reasonably foreseeable hazard to a person exercising ordinary care and therefore imposes no duty to repair or warn. The court emphasized the minimal size of the defect, the absence of aggravating circumstances, and the unreasonable burden that a contrary rule would place on large commercial landowners in a midwestern climate.

For practicing attorneys, this decision reinforces the vitality of the de minimis doctrine in Illinois premises liability cases and underscores the critical importance of consistent deposition testimony, as post-deposition affidavits that contradict prior sworn statements will be disregarded at the summary judgment stage.

In this post-dissolution appeal from St. Clair County, Kenneth Brosh challenged a February 2023 trial court order that denied his petition to terminate maintenance based on alleged de facto marriage, denied his claim of a substantial change in income, extended Donna's maintenance at $3,000 per month for 30 months retroactive to January 2022, and reduced child support from $2,301.69 to $1,493.00. Kenneth proceeded pro se on appeal. The Fifth District affirmed on all issues.

On the de facto marriage claim, the court applied the totality-of-circumstances test under Section 510(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and found the evidence—Richard spending only one night in Donna's home over two and a half years, minimal shared holidays, and a repaid loan—insufficient to establish a resident, continuing conjugal relationship. On the income modification claim, the trial court found Kenneth's testimony not credible due to lack of transparency regarding rental income, determined his income remained $313,493 annually, and the appellate court deferred to those credibility findings. The maintenance extension was upheld given Donna's fluctuating income, inexperience managing rental properties received at dissolution, pandemic-related delays, health issues, and Kenneth's own failure to pay support beginning January 2022.

Practically, this case reinforces that the burden to prove de facto marriage is demanding and fact-intensive, that undocumented income claims will not overcome adverse credibility findings, and that courts retain broad discretion to extend maintenance where the recipient faces documented obstacles to self-sufficiency. Donna's request for Rule 375(b) sanctions was denied because Kenneth cited case law and made substantive arguments, even though all were rejected.