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2026 IL App (1st) 251138 No. 2026 IL App (1st) 251138

Potomac Group, Inc. v. Pezzola

Rule 23 Civil Real Estate Law

Filed
Wednesday, August 12, 2026
Docket
2026 IL App (1st) 251138
Citation
2026 IL App (1st) 251138
Status
Rule 23 — nonprecedential

Holdings

  • A seller need only tender good title at closing; cancellation before the closing date defeats a buyer's premature 'unable to convey' theory.
  • Continued negotiations after a buyer's cancellation can raise fact questions on waiver or partial breach, precluding summary judgment for either side.
  • Useful for real estate and contract litigators handling anticipatory repudiation, earnest money disputes, and prevailing-party attorney fee provisions.

Summary

Potomac Group sued Pezzola for breach of a real estate contract after a failed closing, and Pezzola counterclaimed for return of his $50,000 earnest money deposit. The circuit court denied Potomac's summary judgment motion, granted summary judgment to Pezzola on Potomac's third amended complaint (finding Potomac breached by being unable to convey title), denied Potomac leave to amend its pleadings, granted summary judgment to Pezzola on his counterclaim, and awarded Pezzola over $136,000 in attorney fees under a prevailing-party provision in a contract rider.

The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, reversed the grant of summary judgment for Pezzola on the original complaint, holding that a seller need not hold title at contract execution but only be able to tender a deed at the specified closing time; because the buyers cancelled before the March 21, 2019 closing date, there was no record evidence establishing Potomac's inability to convey title at that time. The court affirmed denial of Potomac's own summary judgment motion, finding factual disputes over whether the buyers' cancellation was a material breach or was excused or waived by the parties' subsequent conduct in continuing to negotiate. The court also reversed summary judgment on Pezzola's counterclaim, since the finding that Potomac breached first (which had excused Pezzola's nonperformance) was undermined, and additional fact issues existed regarding a separate April contract underlying the counterclaim.

Because the fee award depended on Pezzola's status as the prevailing party, the court vacated it as premature. The court declined to reach the amendment issues, leaving them open for remand. This unpublished Rule 23 decision is instructive for attorneys litigating real estate breach claims, anticipatory repudiation, waiver through continued negotiation, and contractual attorney fee provisions tied to prevailing-party status.

In short

A seller's ability to convey title is measured at the specified closing date, not at contract signing; cancellation before that date defeats a claim that the seller was unable to convey title.

Continued negotiation and conduct after a breach can create factual disputes over waiver or excuse of a subsequent breach, precluding summary judgment for either party.

Summary judgment on a counterclaim premised on the first-to-breach doctrine cannot stand where the underlying finding that the opposing party breached first is reversed.

An attorney fee award based on a prevailing-party contractual provision must be vacated as premature when the underlying summary judgment establishing prevailing-party status is reversed.

This summary was drafted by AI and verified against the slip opinion. It may contain errors and is not legal advice — always read the original before relying on it.