People v. Lowe
Key Takeaways
- 1 Illinois appellate court holds AHC statute facially constitutional; felons fall outside Second Amendment's protection.
- 2 Nonviolent felon status does not shield defendant from AHC prosecution; Heller places no qualifier on 'felon.'
- 3 Relevant for criminal defense attorneys challenging felon firearm statutes on Second Amendment grounds post-Bruen.
Summary
Steve Lowe was convicted by a Cook County jury of armed habitual criminal (AHC) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. His predicate convictions were drug-related offenses. After the trial court denied his post-trial motions, Lowe appealed, arguing the AHC statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him as a nonviolent felon under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen.
The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on both grounds, applying de novo review. On the facial challenge, the court held that felons are not among 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment, relying on repeated Supreme Court statements in Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi that the amendment protects law-abiding citizens and that felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful. Because felons fall outside the Second Amendment's scope entirely, the Bruen analytical framework does not apply. On the as-applied challenge, the court rejected the violent/nonviolent felon distinction, noting that neither Heller nor Bruen qualified the term 'felon,' and that historical colonial-era disarmament practices support broad felon prohibitions.
For criminal defense attorneys, this decision forecloses both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the AHC statute based on a defendant's nonviolent criminal history, consistent with a strong line of Illinois appellate authority.
Key Holdings
1. The AHC statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)) is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment because felons are not part of 'the people' protected by the amendment, and the Bruen analytical framework does not apply to felon firearm prohibitions.
2. The AHC statute is constitutional as applied to a defendant whose predicate convictions were nonviolent drug offenses, because neither Heller nor Bruen distinguished between violent and nonviolent felons or placed any qualifier on the word 'felon.'
3. Felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful under Supreme Court precedent, and a defendant challenging such a statute bears a heavy burden to rebut the strong judicial presumption of constitutionality.
4. Historical colonial-era prohibitions disarming individuals whose status indicated untrustworthiness to obey the law provide support for modern broad felon firearm prohibitions, regardless of whether the predicate offense was violent.