Roberto Estrada was convicted of four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to two consecutive eight-year terms. After his direct appeal was affirmed, he filed a pro se postconviction petition. Following earlier appellate proceedings that remanded for second-stage review, appointed postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and adopted all pro se claims. The circuit court dismissed two claims at the second stage — that trial counsel failed to introduce an exculpatory video and failed to consult with or call a DNA expert — and Estrada appealed, arguing postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance on both claims.

The appellate court affirmed both dismissals. On the video claim, the court held that because the DVD was part of the trial record and in the circuit clerk's possession, counsel's averment that he examined all exhibits in the clerk's possession satisfied Rule 651(c). Because Estrada failed to include the video in the appellate record, the court applied Foutch v. O'Bryant and resolved all doubts against him, finding no basis to presume the video was exculpatory. On the DNA expert claim, the court held that postconviction counsel had no duty to formulate a new, more specific claim where the pro se petition failed to identify any particular expert, explain the significance of potential testimony, or show how such testimony would benefit the defense.

For postconviction practitioners, this decision reinforces that a Rule 651(c) certificate raises a rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance that the petitioner bears the burden to overcome, and that counsel is not obligated to independently develop vague, undeveloped claims lacking specific factual support from the petitioner.

Ricky Robinson was convicted after a bench trial of first-degree murder and related offenses stemming from a December 1997 killing and sentenced to natural life in prison. Following multiple prior appeals and postconviction proceedings, Robinson filed a successive postconviction petition asserting actual innocence — based on new testimony from three witnesses purportedly implicating Leonard Tucker — and a proportionate penalties challenge under the Illinois Constitution grounded in Miller v. Alabama and evolving neuroscientific research on young adult brain development. The Cook County circuit court denied the petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing, and Robinson appealed.

The First District affirmed on both claims. On actual innocence, the court deferred to the circuit court's credibility findings, which rejected all three new witnesses as either not credible, non-exculpatory, or offering inadmissible hearsay. The new testimony could not overcome Robinson's own detailed 70-page confession, corroborated by multiple State witnesses who had no motive to fabricate. On the proportionate penalties claim, the court applied People v. Moore and People v. Horshaw to hold that the essential legal tools for such challenges were always available in initial postconviction proceedings, that Miller does not provide cause for young adult claims, and that a neuroscientific report based on Robinson's own questionnaire answers does not constitute newly discovered evidence establishing cause.

This decision reinforces the high bar for actual innocence claims at the third stage and confirms that successive postconviction petitions are an unavailable vehicle for young adult proportionate penalties challenges under controlling Illinois Supreme Court precedent.