Essie Nooner was convicted by jury of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder under an accountability theory and originally sentenced to 66 years. On his first direct appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded solely for resentencing after finding the trial court had misapprehended the evidence. On remand, a different judge imposed a total of 56 years — the statutory minimum for an adult — consisting of consecutive terms with mandatory 15-year firearm enhancements. Nooner appealed again, raising three issues: (1) that original appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge sufficiency of the evidence; (2) that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause given his youth, trauma, and limited culpability; and (3) that the circuit court abused its discretion by declining to sentence him as a juvenile.

The appellate court affirmed on all three issues. It held that a second direct appeal following a limited resentencing remand is not the proper vehicle for an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, which belongs in a postconviction petition. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that because Nooner is eligible for parole after 20 years under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b), he faces no de facto life sentence, and mandatory firearm enhancements do not shock the moral sense of the community. The court also upheld the circuit court's rejection of defense expert Dr. Garbarino's opinion that Nooner was developmentally a juvenile, citing contradictions between the PSIs and the expert's limited, unverified evaluation.

This decision is significant for defense attorneys navigating resentencing remands and proportionate penalties clause arguments for young adult offenders. It clarifies that the scope of a second direct appeal is strictly limited to issues arising from the resentencing proceeding itself, and that parole eligibility under the 2024 statute is a critical factor in defeating de facto life sentence arguments.

Elliott Robinson was convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial in Cook County and sentenced to 48 years' imprisonment. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a postconviction petition raising actual innocence, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and a proportionate penalties clause violation. The circuit court dismissed the actual innocence and proportionate penalties claims at the second stage and denied the ineffective assistance claim after a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Robinson appealed all three rulings.

The First District affirmed the denial of the ineffective assistance claim, finding no prejudice because the trial evidence was not closely balanced — supported by a dying declaration, voting records, defendant's own admission to being present, a witness identification, and toolmark evidence — and no deficient performance because appellate counsel had considered the issue and exercised professional judgment in pursuing stronger claims. However, the court reversed the second-stage dismissals of both the actual innocence and proportionate penalties claims. Applying the standard from People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, the court held that new witness affidavits identifying a different shooter and Dr. Garbarino's developmental psychology report were not 'positively rebutted' by the trial record, meaning it was not clear that no fact finder could ever accept their truth. Both claims were remanded for third-stage evidentiary hearings.

Practically, this decision reinforces that contradictions between new postconviction evidence and the trial record do not automatically constitute positive rebuttal at the second stage, and that as-applied Miller-type proportionate penalties claims by young adult offenders are properly developed and raised in initial postconviction petitions.

This opinion from Rule 23 was filed on 2026-06-02. The case "In re Marriage of Seyl, 2026 IL App (2d) 240719" (Docket: 2026 IL App (2d) 240719) addresses important legal issues. Due to technical difficulties, the full AI summary is temporarily unavailable. Please review the full opinion for complete details.

Jermaine Cooper pleaded guilty in 2006 to delivery of a controlled substance near a park and received a 12-year sentence. After completing his sentence and exhausting prior postconviction efforts, Cooper filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition in January 2024 seeking to vacate the 2022 dismissal of his Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) petition. The circuit court dismissed the section 2-1401 petition in May 2024, characterizing it as a postconviction petition and finding Cooper lacked standing. Cooper appealed, arguing the court improperly recharacterized his petition without providing the admonishments required under People v. Shellstrom and People v. Pearson.

The First District affirmed on both issues. First, the court held that the circuit court did not actually recharacterize the petition — despite inartful language, the ruling was substantively a merits dismissal of the section 2-1401 petition itself. Second, the court held that sua sponte dismissal was proper because Cooper's section 2-1401 petition was directed solely at obtaining PCHA relief, and Cooper had no standing under the PCHA having already completed his sentence, including mandatory supervised release.

For practitioners, this case reinforces that Shellstrom and Pearson admonishments serve no purpose when a petitioner has permanently lost postconviction standing, and that courts may dismiss section 2-1401 petitions sua sponte after 30 days when the relief sought is legally unavailable on the face of the petition.

Anthony Perez was convicted of first-degree murder committed in 1979 when he was 18 years old and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. In 2019, he filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition asserting an Eighth Amendment Miller claim, a proportionate penalties clause claim under the Illinois Constitution, and arguments grounded in scientific studies on young adult brain development. The circuit court ultimately dismissed both claims, and Perez appealed, also arguing that appointed postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance.

The First District affirmed on all three issues. First, the court held that Miller's Eighth Amendment protections apply only to juvenile offenders and cannot be extended to defendants who were 18 or older at the time of the offense — a policy choice the court left to the legislature or the Illinois Supreme Court. Second, the court held that Perez could not establish cause for his proportionate penalties clause claim because such challenges have been available in Illinois for decades, predating Miller, and neither subsequent Miller-related case law nor generalized scientific studies on young adult brain development constitute an objective factor that prevented earlier assertion of the claim. Third, the court found no unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel, who filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and had no obligation to advance legally meritless arguments against binding supreme court authority.

This decision reinforces the strict boundaries of the cause-and-prejudice test for successive postconviction petitions and confirms that brain science studies alone — without case-specific evidence tied to the defendant's own mental functioning — will not satisfy the cause prong.

In September 2019, Juan Duclerk was charged with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, a Class 4 felony, after failing to stop for officers in Coles County. Following a bench trial in April 2024—conducted in absentia—the trial court found Duclerk guilty based largely on officer testimony describing the vehicle as a 'motorized bike—moped' and photographs showing pedals, a motor, a gas tank, and other features. Duclerk was sentenced to three years' incarceration. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing the State failed to prove the motorbike qualified as a 'motor vehicle' under the Illinois Vehicle Code.

The Fifth District reversed the aggravated fleeing conviction, holding that the State presented no evidence of the motorbike's engine type, horsepower, or speed capability—facts necessary to distinguish a 'motor vehicle' from an exempt 'low-speed gas bicycle.' The court further held that the burden of proving vehicle classification, including that no statutory exception applied, rested on the State, not the defendant, relying on People v. Plank and People v. Grandadam.

Rather than outright acquitting Duclerk, the court exercised its authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) to enter a conviction on the lesser-included offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a Class A misdemeanor, finding sufficient evidence that Duclerk knowingly failed to stop for uniformed officers conducting an authorized traffic stop. The court reduced the sentence to eleven months with no mandatory supervised release and directed entry of a new mittimus.

Michael Talbert was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) following a jury trial in Cook County and sentenced to 16 years in prison. Prior to trial, Talbert moved to dismiss the indictment arguing the AHC statute was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, considered solely whether the AHC statute is facially unconstitutional under the two-step framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Applying the Bruen analysis, the court acknowledged a split among Illinois appellate districts on whether a felon's firearm possession falls within the Second Amendment's plain text at Step 1, but ultimately resolved the constitutional question at Step 2. Relying heavily on People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, and the Supreme Court's statements in Heller and Rahimi that felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful, the court held that the government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the AHC statute is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The court also emphasized that a facial challenge carries a particularly heavy burden — requiring a showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid — and that statutes are presumed constitutional. The decision reinforces a consistent line of First District authority rejecting facial Second Amendment challenges to the AHC statute and is directly useful to practitioners litigating post-Bruen firearm possession charges involving defendants with prior felony convictions.

Vincent Davis was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) in Lake County and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment. The charge arose from an incident captured on surveillance video showing Davis retrieving a firearm from under a store counter, carrying it for over 20 minutes, fleeing with it, and storing it in a safe. The predicate felony was a 1991 armed robbery conviction Davis sustained at age 17, when armed robbery triggered automatic transfer to adult court under the then-applicable Juvenile Court Act. Davis appealed on four grounds: sufficiency of the predicate conviction, denial of necessity jury instructions, a Rule 431(b) voir dire violation, and excessiveness of his sentence.

The Second District affirmed on all counts. Relying on People v. Wallace, 2025 IL 130173, the court held that the 2016 amendment removing armed robbery from the Juvenile Court Act's automatic transfer provision does not retroactively invalidate Davis's 1991 conviction as a predicate felony — the UPWF statute requires only that the defendant 'has been convicted of a felony.' The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct on necessity, finding no evidence of a specific and immediate threat at the time of possession and noting that necessity is unavailable to a defendant who denies committing the charged offense. The Rule 431(b) claim failed because the evidence was overwhelming, precluding first-prong plain error, and the 14-year sentence was within the statutory range with adequate consideration of mitigating factors.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys challenging felon-in-possession charges based on older juvenile-era convictions, and for practitioners evaluating the viability of necessity defenses in weapons cases.

Defendant Dion J. Gordon entered a fully negotiated guilty plea in 2004 to first and second degree murder offenses committed when he was 16, receiving consecutive sentences of 45 and 12 years. In 2020, he filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition asserting Eighth Amendment Miller claims and an Illinois proportionate penalties clause claim. A prior trial judge orally granted leave without making express cause-and-prejudice findings or entering a written order. After reassignment, the new trial court declined to honor that oral grant and denied a renewed motion for leave, finding defendant's constitutional sentencing challenges barred by People v. Jones. Defendant appealed, and OSAD moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, asserting no issue of arguable merit.

The appellate court affirmed on all three potential issues. First, the prior oral grant of leave was ineffective because no express cause-and-prejudice determination was made and no written order was entered, requiring the new court to conduct a fresh analysis. On the merits, Jones squarely bars defendant's claims: a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives constitutional challenges based on subsequent changes in law, and Miller does not apply where the trial court exercised discretion in accepting a negotiated plea with specific sentencing terms. Second, both appointed and retained postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance under Rule 651(c). Third, even assuming the State's participation at the leave-to-file stage was improper under Lusby, remand would be pointless given the clear failure of the cause-and-prejudice test.

This decision is significant for criminal defense attorneys pursuing successive postconviction petitions on behalf of juvenile offenders who pleaded guilty, as it confirms that Jones forecloses Miller-based claims in that context and that oral grants of leave without written orders and express findings carry no procedural effect.

In this interlocutory appeal arising from a first degree murder prosecution in St. Clair County, the State challenged the trial court's partial suppression of the defendant's proffer statement given at a December 13, 2020 meeting. The defendant, a 19-year-old at the time of his arrest, had signed a proffer letter and made a highly incriminating statement. The trial court held the meeting constituted a plea discussion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(f), rendering the statement inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief or to rebut a defense inconsistent with the statement, but permissible for impeachment if the defendant testified contrary to it at trial.

The Fifth District affirmed on both issues. Applying the two-part Friedman test, the court found the defendant exhibited a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea — evidenced by his signed acknowledgment and the incriminating nature of the statement itself — and that expectation was objectively reasonable given the State initiated the proffer, the letter described it as a step toward a plea agreement, and defense counsel was actively negotiating alternative charges. The court rejected the State's reliance on a more restrictive federal standard requiring a specific plea offer, finding it inconsistent with Illinois precedent.

On waiver, the court followed Mezzanatto in recognizing that Rule 402(f) protections can be waived, but held that waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Because defense counsel testified he only explained impeachment use to the defendant and did not himself understand the proffer letter's broader waiver provision, the defendant's knowing waiver extended no further than impeachment. The court expressly reserved judgment on whether broader Rule 402(f) waivers are permissible under different circumstances.

Anthony Steward was convicted after a jury trial in Lake County of four counts of violating an order of protection and one count of domestic battery arising from incidents on April 1 and April 2, 2024, involving his girlfriend Javata Hopes. The circuit court found him extended-term eligible and sentenced him to concurrent five-year terms. On appeal, Steward argued ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient evidence on multiple counts, and improper extended-term sentencing.

The Second District affirmed most convictions but vacated the domestic battery count. The court held that because the body-camera footage was admitted only to show Hopes' demeanor and intoxication—not for the truth of the matter asserted—and Hopes' direct-examination testimony about being struck was entirely qualified and conditional, no competent evidence established that Steward caused her injuries. The court also affirmed the order-of-protection convictions, finding that the short-form notice directing Steward to stay away from Hopes 'at additional locations' gave adequate notice of the 500-foot stay-away provision beyond the specifically listed addresses. The court dismissed review of two merged counts for lack of jurisdiction.

Practically, this decision clarifies that Illinois courts will not extend Erlinger's jury-determination requirement to the straightforward 10-year recency inquiry under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1), and that prosecutors must ensure body-camera footage is admitted for the truth of the matter asserted—or obtain a stipulation—when it forms the evidentiary basis for a charged offense.

Donte Green was convicted after a bench trial of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against a minor victim, D.E.G. The trial court acquitted him of one count of attempted predatory criminal sexual assault and sentenced him to 36 years. Post-trial, Green filed a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry, dismissed all 23 allegations without allowing Green to elaborate, and denied the motion. Green appealed on two grounds: sufficiency of the evidence for three predatory criminal sexual assault convictions and the adequacy of the Krankel inquiry.

On sufficiency, the appellate court affirmed. Although D.E.G.'s trial testimony described only two instances of mouth-to-vagina contact, her forensic interview—admitted as substantive evidence under section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—described three such instances. The court held that inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the forensic interview were credibility questions for the trier of fact, and the circuit court had expressly found D.E.G. highly credible.

On the Krankel issue, the court remanded. The circuit court dismissed all claims as trial strategy without any inquiry, and at least one claim—that counsel failed to introduce exculpatory evidence—necessarily involved matters outside the record that could not be evaluated without further development. The court held that where off-record claims exist, remand for an adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry is required, and harmless error analysis is inapplicable when the record is devoid of information about the nature of the allegations.

Defendant Keveen Fullwiley was convicted in 2012 of drug offenses following a jury trial in Lake County. Before trial, he sought suppression under Franks v. Delaware, arguing the search warrant affidavit contained false statements about four controlled drug purchases. The motion was denied. In 2023, during third-stage postconviction proceedings, the State disclosed chain-of-custody reports it had inadvertently withheld, revealing that one transaction's date contradicted the affidavit and that another occurred while defendant was allegedly out of state. Defendant filed a supplemental postconviction petition asserting a Brady violation, arguing the reports would have changed the outcome of the Franks hearing. The postconviction court denied relief, and defendant appealed.

The appellate court affirmed, applying the three-part Brady test. While the court found the reports were favorable to defendant and had been inadvertently suppressed, it held they were not material. Even assuming the reports would have proven that the affiant knowingly or recklessly fabricated the fourth transaction, the remaining untainted averments — describing two additional controlled purchases in which the affiant searched the informant, observed the transactions, and received cocaine-positive substances — independently established probable cause for the warrant. Excision of the tainted averments would not have voided the warrant.

This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies that a Brady claim tied to a Franks hearing requires a two-stage materiality analysis: courts must assess both whether the withheld evidence would have exposed false statements and whether the expurgated affidavit still supports probable cause. Attorneys must address both prongs to succeed.

In People v. Donald, defendant Antonio Donald was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon following a jury trial in Cook County. Officer Lewis testified about a radio dispatch describing a man with short dreads and a blue jean jacket placing a gun in a book bag. Although the trial court sustained an initial hearsay objection, Lewis subsequently testified multiple times that defendant 'fit the description' and that other men did not, and the State referenced 'the description' at least five times in closing argument. Defendant did not preserve the issue in his motion for a new trial, requiring plain error review on appeal.

The First District held that a clear and obvious error occurred. The repeated references to 'the description' effectively reclaimed the initially excluded hearsay, exceeded a permissible explanation of investigative steps, and made it practically impossible for jurors to disregard the testimony. However, the court found the evidence was not closely balanced under first-prong plain error. Lewis's account was unrefuted and corroborated by body-worn camera footage, a prisoner property sheet signed by defendant, and defendant's own return to the station to retrieve the backpack. Because no genuine credibility contest existed, the error was not prejudicial and the conviction was affirmed. The court declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no prejudice showing was possible.

For criminal defense attorneys, this case illustrates that even where hearsay error is clear, a conviction will survive plain error review if the remaining evidence is sufficiently corroborated and uncontested.

Steve Lowe was convicted by a Cook County jury of armed habitual criminal (AHC) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. His predicate convictions were drug-related offenses. After the trial court denied his post-trial motions, Lowe appealed, arguing the AHC statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him as a nonviolent felon under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen.

The Illinois First District Appellate Court affirmed on both grounds, applying de novo review. On the facial challenge, the court held that felons are not among 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment, relying on repeated Supreme Court statements in Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi that the amendment protects law-abiding citizens and that felon disarmament laws are presumptively lawful. Because felons fall outside the Second Amendment's scope entirely, the Bruen analytical framework does not apply. On the as-applied challenge, the court rejected the violent/nonviolent felon distinction, noting that neither Heller nor Bruen qualified the term 'felon,' and that historical colonial-era disarmament practices support broad felon prohibitions.

For criminal defense attorneys, this decision forecloses both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the AHC statute based on a defendant's nonviolent criminal history, consistent with a strong line of Illinois appellate authority.

Michael Sapp was convicted after a 1997 bench trial of first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, home invasion, and armed robbery, and was sentenced to natural life in prison. After his direct appeal was affirmed and leave to appeal denied, Sapp filed a pro se postconviction petition in December 2018 — nearly 19 years late — arguing his natural life sentence violated the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause as applied to him as a 19-year-old offender, invoking Miller v. Alabama and emerging neuroscience on adolescent brain development. The circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage, and Sapp appealed.

The appellate court affirmed on three independent grounds. First, res judicata barred Sapp's proportionate penalties claim because he raised a materially identical youth-based challenge on direct appeal in 1998; reframing the argument through Miller and new scientific literature did not transform it into a new claim. Second, the petition was untimely, and Sapp failed to show lack of culpable negligence because Miller and Montgomery address Eighth Amendment rights of offenders under 18 and do not apply to adult offenders, meaning the legal theory was available well before 2018. Third, postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance under Rule 651(c); counsel's facially valid certificate created a rebuttable presumption Sapp failed to overcome with anything beyond speculation.

This decision reinforces that Illinois courts will strictly apply res judicata and timeliness rules to Miller-inspired postconviction claims brought by young adult offenders, and that a Rule 651(c) certificate creates a strong presumption of reasonable assistance absent concrete record evidence to the contrary.

Sebastian Rodriguez was convicted of first-degree murder for a 2008 shooting he committed at age 15. After multiple rounds of appellate review driven by evolving juvenile sentencing law, the circuit court resentenced him to 45 years—20 years for first-degree murder plus a discretionary 25-year firearm enhancement. Rodriguez appealed, arguing his sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller v. Alabama and that the court failed to adequately weigh the mandatory mitigating factor concerning outside pressure and negative influences under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(2).

The First District affirmed on both issues. On the Miller claim, the court held that because the sentence was fully discretionary—with a range from 20 years to natural life and no mandatory firearm enhancement—no finding of irredeemability was constitutionally required. The sentencing court had considered all 12 statutory mitigating factors, which Illinois courts have recognized as consistent with Miller's framework, and Rodriguez was eligible for parole after 20 years. On the statutory factor claim, the court found the circuit court had explicitly addressed Rodriguez's difficult childhood, parental gang involvement, and negative home environment under both factor (2) and the overlapping factor (3). Rodriguez's objection amounted to a challenge to the weight assigned, not a failure to consider.

This case is significant for practitioners navigating post-Miller resentencing proceedings, clarifying that discretionary juvenile sentences do not require an explicit irredeemability finding and that overlapping statutory factors may satisfy multiple mitigating considerations.

Rakym Jones was convicted by a Cook County jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder arising from a 2011 shooting that permanently injured a 13-month-old child. Jones was 16 at the time of the offense and was sentenced to two consecutive 30-year terms (60 years total). On appeal, he raised four grounds: (1) improper admission of Officer Smith's testimony about Jones holding his waistband and possessing cannabis, in violation of a 2013 motion in limine ruling; (2) denial of his motion to reopen the suppression hearing to impeach Sergeant Johnson with a prior adverse credibility finding; (3) that his 60-year sentence constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) that the sentence violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause and is otherwise excessive.

The First District affirmed on all grounds. Although it found both evidentiary rulings erroneous — the trial court improperly admitted the barred testimony and incorrectly applied trial evidentiary rules to the suppression hearing — neither error was prejudicial given two eyewitness identifications, an inculpatory statement, and ASA Hughes's independent, unimpeached suppression testimony. On sentencing, the court held that the Illinois youth parole statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)), which provides parole eligibility after 10 years with additional opportunities every five years, forecloses any de facto life sentence argument under People v. Spencer. The proportionate penalties challenge also failed given the trial court's thorough Miller-factor analysis and extensive evidence of post-incarceration misconduct negating rehabilitative potential.

This decision is significant for practitioners because it applies Spencer to firmly close the Eighth Amendment de facto life sentence avenue for juvenile offenders in Illinois, while also clarifying that Illinois Rule of Evidence 104(a) exempts suppression hearings from ordinary evidentiary rules — a point defense counsel should raise proactively when seeking to reopen suppression proofs.

Dakota Spears, a twice-convicted felon, was found in possession of 30 rounds of .22-caliber ammunition and a bulletproof vest. A Champaign County jury convicted him of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) as a Class X felony under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) and (e), the latter provision enhancing the offense to a 10-to-40-year sentencing range when a felon simultaneously possesses firearm ammunition and body armor. The trial court sentenced Spears to 14 years. On appeal, Spears raised four constitutional challenges: facial due process, as-applied proportionate penalties and Eighth Amendment, excessive sentence, and Second Amendment violations.

The Fifth District affirmed on all grounds. On due process, the court applied rational basis review, finding the body armor enhancement rationally related to the legislature's legitimate interest in deterring armed, armored felons. The statute was neither overbroad nor vague, and the court declined to conduct a cross-comparison penalty analysis under the guise of a due process claim. On proportionate penalties, the specific facts of Spears's case—including evidence linking him to a shooting and photographs of him wearing the vest while holding what appeared to be a firearm—demonstrated the legislature's rationale and did not shock the moral conscience. The 14-year sentence, only four years above the mandatory minimum, was not an abuse of discretion.

On the Second Amendment, the court held at Bruen step one that convicted felons are not among 'the people' protected by the Second Amendment and that the right to bear arms does not extend to body armor, declining to reach the historical tradition analysis. Defense attorneys litigating felon-in-possession or sentencing enhancement cases should note the court's firm rejection of nonviolent-felon distinctions under Bruen and its refusal to allow cross-comparison proportionality arguments to be reframed as due process claims.

Patrick Comi was convicted in 1995 following a jury trial of aggravated battery with a firearm upon a peace officer, attempted first degree murder, and armed robbery, and sentenced to 90 years in prison for offenses committed when he was 21 years old. In 2020, Comi sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition arguing his sentence constituted an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under both the Eighth Amendment and Illinois's proportionate penalties clause, relying on evolving brain science regarding adolescent and emerging-adult development. The circuit court granted leave, advanced the petition to the second stage, but ultimately dismissed it. Comi appealed.

The First District affirmed. On the Eighth Amendment claim, the court held that Miller v. Alabama applies exclusively to offenders under 18, foreclosing relief for Comi at age 21. On the proportionate penalties claim, the court held that Comi failed to establish 'cause' under the cause-and-prejudice test required for successive petitions. Binding Illinois Supreme Court precedent establishes that emerging-adult proportionate penalties claims based on evolving brain science are extensions of claims that always existed under Illinois law, meaning Miller and related neuroscience provided only 'helpful support' for a preexisting claim—insufficient to constitute cause. The court expressed sympathy for Comi's position but held it was bound by precedent.

For practitioners, this decision confirms that the window for emerging-adult defendants to raise proportionate penalties claims in successive postconviction petitions is effectively closed under current Illinois Supreme Court precedent, and that such claims should be raised at the earliest opportunity in initial petitions or on direct appeal.